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Shared Parenting Laws: Mistakes of Pooling?
Margaret F. Brinig, Notre Dame Law School
In their recent paper “Anti-Herding Regulation,” forthcoming in the Harvard
Business Review,1 Ian Ayres and Joshua Mitts argue that many well-intentioned public
policy regulations potentially harm rather than help situations. That is, because the rules
seek to pool—or herd—groups of people, treating them as equal, they miss or mask
important differences among the regulated, thus magnifying systematic risk. Antiherding regulation, on the other hand, can produce socially beneficial information, in
their words steering “both private and public actors toward better evidence-based
outcomes.” Left to their own, or with various carrot-and-stick incentives, some groups,
anyway, would instead fare better if allowed to separate or diverge.
Ayres and Mitts buttress their case with examples from engineering (bridges
collapsing because soldiers crossed them in cadences matched to the structures’
oscillations), finance (mandating only low percentages down for real estate purchasers),
biodiversity and ecosystem stability, and genetic variation itself. They conclude with
various suggestions based on menu approaches and systems design theory.
The need for anti-herding law might also apply to certain (common law/judicial)
contexts – including, this article argues, child custody decisions. Typically and for
separation of powers considerations, courts and the court process conduct a structurally
different role from administrative agencies. However, when the legislature or a higher
court devises a presumption that regulates conduct, judges are not as free to use their
discretion in interpreting the law as they usually are, particularly as they would be with
an opened-ended goal like deciding custody “in the best interests of the child.” What
child custody statutes with presumptions do is to assume that the road to the “best
interests” of each child is the same: that is, that a single solution will prove to be best for
all children. In the law and economics framework of Ayres and Mitts, the statutes
promote a “pooling” rather than a “separating” equilibrium.2
In purely financial or commercial settings, this sort of forcing may not be
inappropriate, and may in fact be constitutionally necessary (under the equal protection
clause, for example, historically disadvantaged groups cannot without good and
permissible reason be treated differently). 3 However, with very few exceptions (such as

1

Anti-Herding Regulation, John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy,
Research Paper No. 490 (Yale Law School, 2014), forthcoming 4 HARVARD BUS. L. REV. – (2014).
2
In contrast, something like a lottery or randomized solution would produce separation, though a
much better solution for individual children might do much better. See NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE;
ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 93 (2002)(“Whatever other advantages or drawbacks might
attach to determining child custody by the flipping of a coin, there seems to be no doubt that the idea brings
with it…a negative symbolic resonance”); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of
the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,5 (1987. In fiction, see HENRY JAMES, WHAT MAISIE KNEW (1897).
3
See, e.g., Paul Brest, Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1970).
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for Native Americans under the Indian Child Welfare Act),4 whole groups of children
cannot be forced into similar parenting situations5 as long as parents are acting within the
quite broad variance given to “fitness.”6 It is this type of pooling that may in fact
threaten systematic risk for those children least likely to have resources to cope with
them—those whose parents cannot get along even to the extent of co-parenting well, or
where there are the barriers to trust posed by such conditions as substance abuse,7 mental
illness8 or coercive-control intimate partner violence,9 or even where the parents
struggled to maintain a viable financial life when living in a single household, now
divided into two. A stronger objection, perhaps, is both that the presumption denies
information to other separating parents (according to the Ayres and Mitts framework), a
possibility we will consider later, and that the presumption itself may be ill conceived for
at least a large number of families.10
Presumptions in child custody are naturally disfavored by three groups—the
judges who lose their discretion and seemingly a part of their “raison d’être” (though
deciding contested custody cases is difficult and uncomfortable), the helping
professionals who otherwise would assist in making determinations based on “best
interests,” and whatever group is disfavored by the particular way the presumption is set.

The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C . §§ 1901-1963. § 1901 (5) recognizes that “the
States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through
administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”
5
See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), in which Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that “Tribal jurisdiction under § 1911(1) was not meant to be
defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe, for Congress was concerned not solely about the
interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large
numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians…” Id. at 49. “It is not ours to say whether the trauma
that might result from removing these children from their adoptive family should outweigh the interest of
the Tribe—and perhaps the children themselves—in having them raised as part of the Choctaw community.
Id at 54. ICWA gives preference to tribal or Indian families, but operates primarily by vesting jurisdiction
in tribal rather than state courts.
6
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)(“it cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”).
7
See, e.g., Nancy Suchman et al., Substance-Abusing Mothers and Disruptions in Child Custody:
An Attachment Perspective, 30 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREAT. 197 (2008).
8
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 518.17 provides for the court to consider “the mental and physical health
of all individuals involved; except that a disability, as defined in section 363A.03, of a proposed custodian
or the child shall not be determinative of the custody of the child, unless the proposed custodial
arrangement is not in the best interest of the child.”
9
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.13 (2002 (presuming
that domestic violence situations are not presumably detrimental to being custodial parents.
Section 2.13 provides that the court shall limit or deny access and responsibility of a parent
otherwise allocated responsibility under a parenting plan to secure the safety and welfare of the
child or of a child’s parent, where it finds that interests of the child would be served by such limit
or denial, in light of credible evidence that the parent to be limited has “abused, neglected, or
abandoned a child, as defined by state law; has inflicted domestic abuse, or allowed another to
inflict domestic abuse.
10
See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 779 (2006)
4

2

Custody rules, including the ones examined here, are generally set with a great
deal of advocacy but without a great deal of empirical research behind them, and are
rarely tested carefully to see whether justice to the individual affected children is being
served. This paper presents an initial foray into such a test, looking at the effect of a
strong child shared custody presumption on the behavior of parents and judges during
and within five years of the original custody proceeding. There are limitations to this
empirical approach: most of the case files do not provide close glimpses into what the
parents were thinking at any given point in time, what arrangements judges would have
ordered absent the presumption, or what professionals such as custody evaluators would
have done differently. While my observations in each case begin with the initial filing in
2008 and end with the last filing in early 2014 (or before), they are not longitudinal in the
sense that I can show causation. To obtain that sort of predictive ability, at minimum one
would need to have a change in the law and cases from before and after the law took
effect. It would also be helpful to have a “control” state with generally similar legal rules
and social norms but where no such change in the law took place. Nonetheless, the
ability to look at two counties (Maricopa and Pima) in the same state (Arizona) provides
the opportunity to examine differences in implementation.
Even with these limitations, the picture is a mixed one: some couples do fine with
shared custody, and are able to adjust over time without result to acrimonious processes.
Their children are presumably better for the frequent and meaningful contact with both
the parents.11 The successes must be weighed against another group of cases where, at
best, shared parenting seems to take place at the price of considerable parental conflict
and continued litigation.12 The emerging factual pattern seems to fit within Ayres and
Mitts’ prescription for a separating equilibrium, while the presumption, bolstered by
strong community support (in Pima County, at any rate)13 for shared parenting, pushes
for a pooling equilibrium highlighted by equally shared custody. Particularly
troublesome (and unstable) are cases involving indications of domestic violence and/or
substance abuse as well as those from the lower half of family incomes and the increasing
number of unmarried couples affected by custody and child support orders.
I will proceed by describing the system of judicial discretion in custody
proceedings as well as the current political struggle over custody standards and
presumptions. I will then present the Ayres and Mitts model, and will continue with
empirical findings from more than 1000 cases in two Arizona counties that together
represent 70% of the population of the state, followed by a brief conclusion.
11

Accord, see Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Closing the Gap: Research, Policy,
Practice and Shared Parenting, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 152, 154 (3) (2014) (Social science supports shared
parenting when both parents agree to it).
12
Some of the costs of litigation are explored in Robert H., Mnookin &Lewis Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) at 971-72.
13
Sanford Braver et al. Lay Judgments About Child Custody, 17 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212 (2011)
(jury pool candidates surveyed about what they thought was fair and what they would do given various
scenarios; 69% were in favor of equal custody if each parent had done approximately the same amount of
child care before separation, but this declined to 21% when the mother had done most of the child care or
27% where father had done most of the child care during the marriage). The answers were similar even
where the couple was high conflict.
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I.

Custody Standards and Judicial Discretion

Academics, especially those writing in family law, present child custody proceedings
as exemplars of discretionary decisionmaking.14 Legislatures have long realized that
dissolving families that present cases where judges must choose between fit parents need
to be individualized,15 since each family presents its own unique characteristics.16 The
goal is not to reward parents as much as to serve their children’s needs.17 While children
all need food, shelter and clothing, their individual emotional needs, medical
requirements, and educational needs vary like snowflakes. While parents are the parties
in custody proceedings, children are always the intended third party beneficiaries18 of
whatever agreement the parents make or arrangement the court orders. Statutes are
therefore typically drawn broadly to include the “best interests of the child” language,
most with a list of factors to help guide courts.19 More recent legislative forays indicate
14

Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONT. PROBS. 226, 250-51 (1975); Robert A. Burt, Experts, Custody Disputes, &
Legal Fantasies, 14 THE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL 140 (19830; David .L Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 491 (1984); Mary Ann
Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TULANE L.
REV. 1165, 1181 (1986); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA’s
Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215 (1991).
15
See finding 1 from Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 11 (“The most effective decision-making about
parenting time after separation is inescapably case-specific”), and finding that “Statutory presumptions
prescribing specific allocations of shared parenting time are unsupportable since no prescription will fit all,
or even the majority of, families’ particular circumstances.”
16
As Schneider, supra note 12, acknowledges, judges act within the constraints of social norms as
well as their legal training and the norms that training inculcates (Citing H.A. Finlay, Judicial Discretion in
Family and Other Litigation, 2 MONASH L. REV. 221, 222 (1976)).
17
Statutes may state that the best interests of the child are the primary concern. See, e.g., Va. Code
124.2, Tex. Code § 153.002; Wis. Stat. § 20-1242. The ALI Principles, supra note 9, make this explicit, as
§ 2.02(2) (fairness to the parties is secondary). See also Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making:
An Interpretative Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 893-94
(2000).
18
See, e.g., Drake v. Drake, 455 N.Y.S.2d 420 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (while child could sue directly
for the college tuition or insurance prescribed in the parents’ separation agreement, and was an intended
beneficiary of the monthly support payments, only the mother had the ability to enforce the ongoing duty of
support). Jill Hasday maintains that this retention of parental rights often conflicts with the children’s
interests. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 849-50 (2004).
19
Carl Schneider, supra note 12, suggests that this slightly cabined form of discretion (using
guidelines or factors) seem to acknowledge the possible desirability of cabining discretion but the
impossibility of doing so in any very confining way.” See also the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA) §401 (now Model Marriage and Divorce Act); Minn. Stat. §518.17 (2013) provides in part:
Subdivision 1.The best interests of the child. (a) "The best interests of the child" means all relevant
factors to be considered and evaluated by the court including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
(2) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to
express preference;
(3) the child's primary caretaker;
(4) the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and the child;
(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent or parents, siblings, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests;
(6) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
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sine-like traverses across the best interests standard, with some presumptions (like the
primary caretaker presumption and the ALI replication principle) largely favoring

(7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability
of maintaining continuity;
(8) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home;
(9) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; except that a disability, as defined in
section 363A.03, of a proposed custodian or the child shall not be determinative of the custody of
the child, unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interest of the child;
(10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love, affection, and guidance, and
to continue educating and raising the child in the child's culture and religion or creed, if any;
(11) the child's cultural background;
(12) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to domestic abuse, as defined in
section 518B.01, that has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another
individual, whether or not the individual alleged to have committed domestic abuse is or ever was
a family or household member of the parent; and
(13) except in cases in which a finding of domestic abuse as defined in section 518B.01 has been
made, the disposition of each parent to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact by
the other parent with the child.
The court may not use one factor to the exclusion of all others. The primary caretaker factor may
not be used as a presumption in determining the best interests of the child. The court must make
detailed findings on each of the factors and explain how the factors led to its conclusions and to
the determination of the best interests of the child.
Similarly, Ariz. Stat. 25-403 sets out a best interests standard as follows:
25-403. Legal decision-making; best interests of child
A. The court shall determine legal decision-making and parenting time, either originally or on
petition for modification, in accordance with the best interests of the child. The court shall
consider all factors that are relevant to the child's physical and emotional well-being, including:
1. The past, present and potential future relationship between the parent and the child.
2. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parent or parents, the child's
siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.
3. The child's adjustment to home, school and community.
4. If the child is of suitable age and maturity, the wishes of the child as to legal decision-making
and parenting time.
5. The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
6. Which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with
the other parent. This paragraph does not apply if the court determines that a parent is acting in
good faith to protect the child from witnessing an act of domestic violence or being a victim of
domestic violence or child abuse.
7. Whether one parent intentionally misled the court to cause an unnecessary delay, to increase the
cost of litigation or to persuade the court to give a legal decision-making or a parenting time
preference to that parent.
8. Whether there has been domestic violence or child abuse pursuant to section 25-403.03.
9. The nature and extent of coercion or duress used by a parent in obtaining an agreement
regarding legal decision-making or parenting time.
10. Whether a parent has complied with chapter 3, article 5 of this title.
11. Whether either parent was convicted of an act of false reporting of child abuse or neglect under
section 13-2907.02.
B. In a contested legal decision-making or parenting time case, the court shall make specific
findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the
best interests of the child.
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mothers,20 while shared or equal-parenting presumptions, despite their non-gendered
terminology, favor fathers who have played modest caretaking functions while the
parents’ relationship remained intact.21
While “best interests of the child” sounds like a neutral model, and has been the
ostensible standard since the late 19th century,22 over time it has taken on different
content that has caused preferences to move between mother and father. Originally, since
living in an intact marriage was presumed best for children, whoever caused that
marriage to break was deemed unfit to care for the child.23 Living with the innocent
parent therefore was in the child’s best interests. By the early twentieth century, as first
Freudian and then attachment theory took center stage in psychiatry and psychology,
“best interests” meant living with one’s mother for a child of tender years. 24 Later, as
constitutional cases made gendered presumptions suspect, and following publication of
the important work of Freud, Goldstein and Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child,25 the standard morphed into living with one’s “primary caretaker.” Concerned
about “the use of custody…being used in an abusive way as a coercive weapon to affect
the level of support payments and the outcome of other issues in the underlying divorce”
and “the urgent need…for a legal structure upon which a divorcing couple may rely in
reaching a settlement,” Justice Neely’s opinion proposed that “the best interests of
children would be best served by awarding them to the primary caretaker parent,
regardless of sex.” The so-called primary caretaker rule became the standard for about
ten years in West Virginia, for a few years by statute in Minnesota, and as a factor in
many more states’ custody framework.26 Of course, because of prevailing mores, this
results in mothers having custody and fathers visitation the vast majority of the time.27
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988) (rules shouldn’t
encourage parental possessiveness and self-centeredness); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental
Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 615 (1992).
21
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody, NELLCO Legal
Scholarship Repository, (Columbia University, 2011)(forthcoming 76 LAW & CONT. PROBS. – (2014).
22
See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 18, at 825, 849 (2004); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 235 (1985); Judith T. Younger,
Responsible Parents and Good Children, 14 LAW & INEQ. 489,497 (1996).
23
Hasday, supra note 18, at 849.
24
See, e.g., J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978); Krieger v. Krieger, 81 P.2d 1081, 1083
(Idaho 1938); Kirstakas v. Kirstakas, 286 A.2d 535, 528 (Md. App. 1972); Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203,
205 (Mo. App 1938).
25
(1973). See also Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of
Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168 (1984-85); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 376 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. 1985). The
rule was also briefly adopted by statute in Minnesota, and criticized by Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond
Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four
Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427 (1990-1991). The phrase
still appears as one of a number of factors in many statutes and in many legal decisions. See, e.g., Minn.
Stat. 518.17 (Factor 3); Gianvito v. Gianvito, (2009 Pa. Super. 1008)(though not always determinative).
26
Discussions of the rule appear in Robert Cochran, The Search for Guidance in Determining the
Best Interests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody Preferences,
20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1985); Crippen, supra note 25.
27
See, e.g., Jed H. Abraham, Why Men Fight for Their Kids: How Bias in the System Puts Dads at a
Disadvantage, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 48 (1994); Steven J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the
Removal of Maternal Preference Made a Difference? 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 255 (1994).
20
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The “best interests” rule itself has also morphed into a more solid standard by the
addition of various factors defining “best interests.”28 A mild form of a default rule can
also be seen in states’ adoption of parenting guidelines.29
For a discussion of the problems of presumptions creating entitlements, see ANDREW I. SCHEPARD,
CHILDREN, COURTS AND CUSTODY, INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 166 (2004):
Furthermore, presumptions that guide custody decisions in contested cases create legal
entitlements that may inadvertently influence the bargaining and trade-offs of divorce settlement
negotiations. A presumption of equal physical custody, for example, generally favors men who
have not taken care of their children on a day-to-day basis, whereas a presumption favoring
primary caretakers and continuity of pre-divorce child care relationships generally favors women.
Each can use a custody presumption in his or her favor as a bargaining chip to seek more favorable
financial terms in a divorce settlement. Because of the custody presumption, the parent who it
favors may receive more economic benefits than he or she would otherwise be entitled to.
Custody presumptions can thus create an incentive for parents to confuse their personal economic
interests with their children’s emotional needs, compounding the difficulties parents already face
in focusing on the children’s best interests in the turbulence of divorce.
See also Scott & Emery, supra note 21 (arguing that the best interest rule has persisted because the groups
are in equipoise, and that “best interests” functions poorly not only because of discretion but also because
mental health professionals are ill-equipped to deal with competing claims of domestic violence and
parental alienation syndrome. For evidence of what judges determined to be unfounded claims of domestic
violence, see Douglas W. Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Do Joint Parenting Laws Make Any Difference? 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 304, 321 & Table 6 (2011). See generally Linda C. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale,
Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Best Interests of Children in the Balance, 42
FAM. L.Q. 381, 395-96 (2008). One recent study finding no evidence of parental alienation (but some of
children deciding themselves for their own reasons not to have contact, is the “Nuffield Report”, Jane
Fortin, Joan Hunt & Lesley Scanlan, Taking a Longer View of Contact: The Perspectives of Young Adults
Who Experienced Parental Separation in Their Youth, Nuffield Foundation, Final Report, November 2012,
xviii [hereinafter Nuffield Report], available at http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/recollections-contactissues-young-adults (last visited April 22, 2013)(398 adults 18-35 interviewed by telephone, with 50 whose
parents separated after the law changed in 1989 and who had contact with the non-custodial parent, having
face to face in-depth interviews).
28
Thus even traditional “best interests” statutes list a set of factors that judges may or may not take
into consideration. For example, the Model Marriage and Divorce Act, Section 402, defines “best
interests” to include “all relevant factors including (1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his
custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child
with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interest; (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school and community. And (5) The mental and physical
health of all individuals involved. The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does
not affect this relationship to the child.” MINN. STAT. ANN. 518.17 includes in addition to these “the
child’s primary caretaker,” “the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and
the desirability of maintaining continuity,” “the permanence as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home,” ”the child’s cultural background,” and “the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser,
if related to domestic abuse…that has occurred between the parents.” The statute bears the same exclusion
of custodial conduct and requires detailed findings on each of the factors and an explanation of how these
led to the court’s conclusion.
29
For Indiana’s, see http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/parenting/. The Indiana Parenting Guidelines
are designed to “represent the minimum recommended time a parent should have to maintain frequent,
meaningful, and continuing contact with a child.” Guidelines at 6. By giving a minimum amount, this also
places an upper boundary, or maximum amount, of time the other parent can have. This would be seem to
meet one of Fennell’s “overharvesting” concerns, Lee Anne Fennell, in Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 1404, 1429-34 (2009), though frequent transfers between parents could also tax the child either
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A variant of both “primary caretaker” and “joint custody,” the replication rule, was
advocated by the American Law Institute in 2000,30 but has only taken statutory root in
one state. West Virginia’s experiment with the primary caretaker rule ended when the
legislature adopted the “replication” standard in 2001. 31 Part of a much larger framework
of placing decisionmaking primarily upon the parents, Section 2.09 provides that in the
case where they cannot agree, the judge will award custody to fit divorcing parents “in
light of the caretaking functions each parent performed for the child before their
separation,” with “the amount of residential time that will allow the child to maintain a
meaningful relationship with each parent.” While in some families this would resemble
the traditional mother-custody-with-frequent and-regular-visitation pattern, the ALI
standard would also (and increasingly, these days32) allow for frequent, and sometimes
equal, contact with both parents, if that is the way they parented before.33 The ALI
replication rule also gives no incentive to divorce based on expectation of custody nor
bargaining leverage that wasn’t there already.34
Joint custody was popularized for a fairly brief time in the late 1980s in a few
states, notably California35 and Wisconsin,36 but joint physical custody was opposed by
feminists and advocates for victims of domestic violence37 as well as some academics
who were concerned about the effect of continued mobility on children, especially
infants.38 Since then, another round of joint custody presumptions has been fomented by
father’s rights groups, who have not been successful in courts on constitutional grounds39
because of the amount of time spent in transportation or in the confusion as the child transitions between
homes and family systems.
30
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at § 2.07 (2000). See also John S. Murray, Improving Parent and
Child Relationships Within the Divorced Family: A Call for Legal Reform, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 563
(1986)
31
W.VA.CODE ANN. §48-9-206 (MICHIE 2001). The test is sometimes called the “approximation
rule.”
32
ELLEN GALINSKY, KERSTIN AUMANN & JAMES T. BOND. GENDER AND GENERATION AT WORK
AND AT HOME. NEW YORK, NY: FAMILIES AND WORK INSTITUTE (2009); Suzanne Bianchi, Maternal
Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic Change or Surprising Continuity, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 401,
411 (2000)(for working two-parent families, fathers do about a third of the child care).
33
A survey of Pima County residents supported equal custody awards in hypothetical situations
where pre-separation parenting was equally shared. See Braver et al., supra note 11.
34
For empirical work examining the relationship between expectations of custody and filing for
divorce, see Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walking”: Why Most
Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126 (2000), Douglas W. Allen & Margaret F. Brinig,
Child Support Guidelines: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 45 FAM. L.Q. 135 (2011).
35
See Catherine R. Albiston & Eleanor E. Maccoby, Does Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 2
STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 167 (1990)(changing the custody standard did not make an appreciable
difference in actual, as opposed to court ordered, custody and visitation patterns.)
36
See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce, Preferences, Legal Rules
and Transaction Costs, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 279 (1993).
37
See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Does Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2 WM. &
MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 1 (1995), and sources cited therein.
38
See, e.g., Samatha Tornello et al., Overnight Custody Arrangements, Attachment, and Adjustment
Among Very Young Children. 75 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 871 (2013).
39
See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Does Parental Autonomy Require Equal Custody at Divorce?, 65
LA. L. REV. 1345 (2005).
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but have gained ground in some state legislatures, notably in Arkansas,40 Arizona,41
Iowa,42 New Mexico43 and Wisconsin.44 For a time in the early 1980s, and increasingly
since the turn of the century, joint custody (meaning alternating or shared custody or
parenting time) has been another option.45 Because both parents, at least in theory, win,46
and because judges need not make difficult custody determinations, joint custody
presumptions have been seen as vindicating parental rights, forcing parents to cooperate
in the reconstituted family,47 and ensuring children the two parent influence so many lack
at parental dissolution.48 The joint custody rule—particularly in its strong form, the equal
40

ARK. CODE § 9-13-101(c)(2).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403.02.
42
IOWA CODE ANN. § 541.41(1)(a)
43
N.M. STAT. § 40-4-91
44
WIS. STAT. § 767.41
45
How often it is actually used, and remains viable for parents, is another matter. For a chart
illustrating the incidence of joint custody internationally, see University of Oxford, Department of Social
Policy and Intervention, Caring For Children After Parental Separation: Would Legislation For Shared
Parenting Time Help Children? (May, 2011). at 4 & Table 1 (3.1% in the U.K. to 28% in Sweden). For
some U.S. state experiences, see fn. 53-58, infra. There is a presumption since 2006 in Australia that the
best interests of the child is to have equal shared parenting responsibility, under the Family Law Act § 61
DA and, that the court must consider whether if reasonably practicable and in the best interests of the child
to spend equal time, or failing that, significant and substantial time, with each parent. Family Law Act § 65
DAA (defined as time allowing each parent to be involved in the child’s daily routine and significant
events. Family Law Act §65 DAA (3).
46
See, e.g., Brinig, Feminism and Child Custody Under Chapter Two of the American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L & POL’Y 301, 314 (2001).
47
For some generally favorable consideration of the idea in principle, see Margaret F. Brinig & F.H.
Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L. J. 393 (1998). More recently, see
ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION
(2d ed. 2012).
48
See, e.g., Pruett & DiFonzio, supra note 11, at 159:
Research has led to widespread agreement among professionals that children generally have
improved prospects after separation and divorce when they have healthy, loving relationships with
two parents before and after separation and divorce. Research has also soundly established that the
multiple changes in home, school, neighborhood, and so on that often accompany separation and
divorce are difficult for children and that continuity and consistency—especially in quality
parenting and parent–child relationships—support child adaptation. In particular, studies have
focused on the importance for children of their fathers staying involved after separation, as fathers
are more likely than mothers to spend less time with or withdraw from their children after
separation.
For a recently adopted favoring both parenting plans and joint custody, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403.02
(effective Jan. 1, 2013)(“B. Consistent with the child’s best interests …the court shall adopt a parenting
plan that provides for both parents to share legal decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes
their respective parenting time.”) See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (c) (2010) (statute as a whole
establishes a presumption of substantial time with each as being in child’s best interests; section (3)
establishes factors governing parenting plan); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (requires court to establish joint
custody implementation order except for good cause show; provides that “to the extent it is feasible and in
the best interest of the child, physical custody of the children should be shared equally”); 40-4-9.1
(establishes a presumption that joint custody is in the child’s best interests but then sets forth factors and
requires parenting plan; no specific time sharing arrangement required though time with each is to be
“significant”).
A recent attempt to enact a very strong presumption of joint custody, S.F. 1218, passed the
legislature but was vetoed by Minnesota’s governor. Another has reportedly been introduced in this year’s
session, as has a similar proposal in Michigan. H.B. 4120, see
41
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custody rule—has been a particular darling of interest groups concerned about the too
real plight of noncustodial parents, especially fathers.49 As a “rights-based” approach, it
has also gleaned support from some civil libertarians,50 and, early on, “sameness”
feminists.51 On a slightly less exalted plain, because child support guidelines shift once a
http://achildsright.typepad.com/achildsright/2013/01/mi-2013-2014-equal-parenting-bill-hb-4120.html and
http://parentalrightsequality.blogspot.com/2013/01/michigan-2013-14-hb-4120-equal.html. In 2005, an
equal time provision was introduced but died in committee in California. AB 1307, Bill Analysis,
Assembly Comm. On Judiciary, May 3, 2005, at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/postquery?bill_number=ab_1307&sess=0506&house=B&author=dymally. See also W. VA. SB 438
(2009), discussed in Alison Knezevich, Sweeping Child-Custody Changes Proposed, 3\16\09,
wvgazette.com; N.Y. A03181 (2009) (requiring court to order joint custody unless contrary to child’s
interest). While Maine and Iowa, IOWA CODE § 541.41(1)(a) have very strong presumptions, at least
Iowa’s Supreme Court has decided that consistent with “best interests,” the legislature could not have
enacted a joint physical custody presumption. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa
2007). For discussion, se http://www.iowafathers.com/. The politics and public choice considerations for
most of this legislation is discussed in Scott &. Emery, supra note 21.
In Great Britain, an equal custody bill was also defeated. See Tim Shipman, Fathers Lose Bid for
Equal Custody Rights after Review of Family Law, mailonline, Nov. 2, 2011; see generally Alexander
Masardo, Managing shared residence in Britain and France: Questioning a default primary carer model. In,
SOCIAL POLICY REVIEW 21 197 (Kirsten Rummery, Ian Greener & Chris Holden,eds.2009). For research
justifying the bill’s defeat, see Nuffield Report, supra note 25, at xviii.
In Australia, the measure achieved more success with 2006 legislation including the introduction
of a presumption in favor of "equal shared parental responsibility" (Family Law Act §61DA(1)), with a
nexus between the application of the presumption and considerations in relation to time arrangements
(Family Law Act §65DAA). The presumption may be rebutted by evidence satisfying a court that it would
not be in a child's best interests for both parents to have equal shared parental responsibility (Family Law
Act §61DA(4)), and it is not applicable where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has
engaged in child abuse or family violence (Family Law Act §61DA(2)). Where orders for shared parental
responsibility are made pursuant to Family Law Act §61DA(1), the courts are obliged to consider whether
making orders for children to spend equal or substantial and significant time with each parent, would be
reasonably practicable and in the child's best interests (Family Law Act § 65DAA). For a discussion, see
Ruth Weston, Lixia Qu, Matthew Gray, John De Maio, Rae Kaspiew, Lawrie Moloney and Kelly Hand,
Shared Care Time: An Increasingly Common Arrangement, Australian Institute of Family Studies, Family
Matters No. 88, 2011, available at http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fm2011/fm88/fm88f.html, For a
discussion of the need to consult children, see PATRICK PARKINSON AND JUDY CASHMORE, THE VOICE OF A
CHILD IN FAMILY LAW DISPUTES (2009) (suggesting that there are both pros and cons of involving children
directly and that in any event they should not be understood to make the decision).
For a discussion of these and other Western European jurisdictions’ custody rules, see PATRICK
PARKINSON, FAMILY LAW AND THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF PARENTHOOD, 45-56 (2011).
49
See, e.g., Fathers and Dads for Equal Custody Rights, http://www.fathersrights.org/.
One interesting statistic is that shared custody families more often involve boys than girls. Sons are
slightly more likely than daughters to be living in a shared parenting family. Heather Juby, Celine
Bourdais, , & Nicole Gratton, Sharing Roles, Sharing Custody, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM., 157 (2005).; Ed
Spruijt & Vincent Duindam, (2010). Joint Physical Custody In The Netherlands And The Well Being Of
Children. 51 J. DIV. & REMARRIAGE, 65, 72 & Table 3 (2010)(19% of the boys and 15% of the girls lived
in shared custody HOUSEHOLDS’ 3561 Dutch children surveyed); Dutch children surveyed); Marygold S.
Melli & Patricia R. Brown, Exploring A New Family Form- The Shared Time Family, 22 INT’L J. L, POL’Y
& 231, 238 & Table 1 (2008)(of 598 surveyed families, 35.7% of the mother custody families had only
girls, compared to 30.9% of the shared placement families).
50
See, e.g., Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and Due Process, 1 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 123 (1999).
For one such argument, see Edward Kruk, Arguments for an Equal Parental Responsibility Presumption in
Contested Child Custody, 40 AM.J. FAMILY THERAPY 33, (2012) (British Columbian social worker).
51
See, e.g., the testimony for the Idaho joint custody bill, 1982 S.B. 1379, introduced by the only
female state senator, Edith Miller Klein, with favorable testimony from a women’s rights advocate. Klein
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child spends some amount of time (typically a quarter to a third) with each parent,
wealthier noncustodial parents are particularly attracted to equal custody shares.52
While this is an empirical point, and one that might be fruitfully explored, it
would be interesting to see whether the attempt by states to segregate the various
categories proposed by Mnookin—saying that child support is fixed by guidelines, for
example, or that nonpayment of child support has no effect on access to children (and
vice-versa), are frustrated by many states’ decision to allow variance from the guidelines
once some threshold time with children is achieved. Some states (among them the large
states of Florida,53 Illinois,54 Massachusetts,55 Pennsylvania,56 Texas57 and Washington58)
successfully sponsored a resolution to eliminate all sex discrimination in Idaho law.
http://www.boiseartsandhistory.org/blog/2012/11/08/mrs-edith-miller-klein-an-idaho-senator/. She and her
husband had no children. Legal Pioneer, Former State Senator Klein Dies At 83, Idaho SpokesmanReview Jan. 2, 1999.
52
See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Supporting Children After Divorce: The Influence
of Custody on Support Levels and Payments, 22 FAM. L.Q. 319, 321 (1988); Jana B. Singer & William L.
Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 517 (1988)(“Legislation skewed toward awards
of joint custody increases the ability of the parent requesting joint custody to engage in this type of
extortion. David Chambers has noted that ‘a parent who is not really interested in having joint custody may
use the threat of demanding it as a tool to induce the other parent to make concessions on issues of property
division and child support.’”)
53
FLA. STAT. § 61-30. The statute provides in (1)(a) that “Notwithstanding the variance limitations
of this section, the trier of fact shall order payment of child support which varies from the guideline amount
as provided in paragraph (11)(b) whenever any of the children are required by court order or mediation
agreement to spend a substantial amount of time with either parent. This requirement applies to any living
arrangement, whether temporary or permanent.” The state does have a shared custody presumption. Fla.
Stat. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (2009), but still requires a best interests determination by the court even if there is
agreement. Sparks v. Sparks, Fla. Dist. Ct. App., No. 1D11-3327, 12/20/11.
54
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/505 (provides for specific percentages of supporting party’s net income
based on number of children, to be varied only if inappropriate after considering the best interests of the
child in light of various relevant factors (not including shared custody). Illinois law contains no statutory
presumption of equal parenting time even where the parents are awarded joint legal custody. Ill. Comp.
Stat. 750 ILL. COMP STAT. § 5/602.1(d) (“Nothing within this section shall imply or presume that joint
custody shall necessarily mean equal parenting time.”)
55
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch, 208, § 28 (allows for rebuttal of presumptive guideline amounts if unjust or
inappropriate under the circumstances and written findings of the specific facts of the case justifying
departure from the guidelines. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 208, § 31 provides that “physical custody shall
be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure a child frequent and continued contact with both
parents.”
56
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4322 (“There shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or
expedited process, that the amount of the award which would result from the application of such guideline
is the correct amount of support to be awarded. A written finding or specific finding on the record that the
application of the guideline would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case shall be sufficient to rebut
the presumption in that case, if based upon” “the reasonable needs of the child or spouse seeking support
and the ability of the obligor to provide support, with primary emphasis on the net incomes and earning
capacities of the parties, with allowable deviations for unusual needs, extraordinary expenses and other
factors, such as the parties’ assets, as warrant special attention.” Since 2010, Pennsylvania’s custody law
provides that “it is public policy of this Commonwealth, when in the best interest of the child, to assure a
reasonable and continuing contact of the child with both parents after a separation or dissolution of the
marriage and the sharing of the rights and responsibilities of child rearing by both parents and continuing
contact of the child or children with grandparents when a parent is deceased, divorced or separated.”
However, shared parenting is just one of the options listed in 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5323.
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do not have an offset for shared parenting time. Others, such as Arizona,59 California,60
Michigan,61 Oregon62 and Virginia,63 do allow for offset. What is the effect on the
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.121 (Section 154.123 does allow, in (b), variance based on “(4) the
amount of time of possession of and access to a child.”) The state does presume that shared parenting is in
the child’s best interests. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.001 (West), for the “public policy of this state”
consists of “assur[ing] that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have
shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child; [] provid[ing] a safe, stable, and nonviolent
environment for the child; and [] encourag[ing] parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their
child after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.”
58
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.19.001 includes in the legislative intent and finding “(3) Reducing the
adversarial nature of the proceedings by increasing voluntary settlements as a result of the greater
predictability achieved by a uniform statewide child support schedule.”
The custody statute provides that “The court shall make residential provisions for each child which
encourage each parent to maintain a loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child, consistent
with the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and economic circumstances.” WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a), but that “[t]he court may order that a child frequently alternate his or her residence
between the households of the parents for brief and substantially equal intervals of time (joint physical
custody) only if the court finds the following:
The parties have agreed to such provisions and the agreement was knowingly and voluntarily
entered into; or
The parties have a satisfactory history of cooperation and shared performance of parenting
functions; the parties are available to each other, especially in geographic proximity, to the extent
necessary to ensure their ability to share performance of the parenting functions; and the
provisions are in the best interests of the child.” Rev. Code Wash. § 26.09.187(3)(b)
A 2009 Washington State study found that “46 percent of children of divorce, statewide, are ordered to
spend a minimum of 35 percent parenting time with their biological fathers.” Bill Harrington, Giving
Parents Equal Parenting Time by Law, Seattle Times, Feb. 25, 2009, at
http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2008786615_opinb26harrington.html.
59
ARIZ REV. STAT. § 25-320. Section (D)(8) provides that “The duration of parenting time and
related expenses” shall be one of the criteria. While Schedule A to the child support guidelines subtracts
some percentage from the amount otherwise owed for various levels of parenting days (computed in six
hour increments) up to 48.6% (for 182 days), Schedule B, in effect when custody is shared equally,
subtracts the lower earning parent’s total amount due from the higher, and then divides the difference in
two. If $2000 per month is owed, and only one parent has any earnings at all, this means the parent who
would otherwise pay $2000 only pays $1000. Thus the biggest disadvantage is to lower earning parents
when incomes are the most disparate. Further, while many states multiply the amount owed in order to
recognize the duplicate fixed expenses when children are living in two households, see Allen & Brinig,
supra note 57, Arizona uses the same total child support duty whether all overnights are with one parent or
whether 50% of the time is spent in each parent’s household. This means that the baseline amount is
lower.
Arizona recently adopted a new parenting time statute. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403.02 (2013),
providing that (B) “Consistent with the child’s best interests …, the court shall adopt a parenting plan that
provides for both parents to share legal decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their
respective parenting time.” There is no explicit preference for joint custody, though the new statute does
provide for maximum time with each parent.
60
CAL. FAM. CODE § 4503 provides in (c) “The guideline takes into account each parent’s actual
income and level of responsibility for the children.” Section 4055 provides for the guideline, and in (3)
provides for a multiplier that is the “approximate percentage of time that the high earner has or will have
primary physical responsibility for the children compared to the other parent.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (b)
provides that “The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure that
children have frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or
dissolved their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to encourage parents to share the rights and
responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy, except where the contact would not be in the
best interest of the child, as provided in Section 3011. “ Section (a) provides that safety of the child is the
57
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percentage of custody awarded to or bargained for by each parent? Lee Fennell, writing
in the property context,64 suggests that sometimes bargaining allows inalienability rules
to become permeable. Even if they are not, the economically stronger party can exert
leverage along other, permissible fronts such as child support in excess of the standard,
or, as Mary Ann Glendon suggests, delay in or cost of, the proceedings.65
court’s primary concern. Section (c) provides “Where the policies set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) of
this section are in conflict, any court's order regarding physical or legal custody or visitation shall be made
in a manner that ensures the health, safety, and welfare of the child and the safety of all family members.”
61
2013 Michigan Child Support Formula Manual. Sec. 3.03 allows for adjustment based on parental
time since “Presuming that as parents spend more time with their children they will directly contribute a
greater share of the children’s expenses, a base support obligation needs to offset some of the costs and
savings associated with time spent with each parents.” The (complicated) formula takes into account the
approximate annual number of overnights spent with each parents as well as the two parents’ base support
obligation. Available at
http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Manuals/focb/2013MCSF.p
df.
The current statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23 provides simply for a list of factors. The
legislature is currently considering a presumptive joint custody statute.
62
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 137-050-0700 et seq. The amount of time each parent spends with their
children is factored into the calculation. A calculator is available following the links at
http://www.oregonchildsupport.gov/calculator/index.shtml.
While Oregon law is complex and requires parenting plans, joint custody is preferred under
107.101:
It is the policy of this state to:(1) Assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with
parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interests of the child;(2) Encourage such
parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their children after the parents have
separated or dissolved their marriage;(3) Encourage parents to develop their own parenting plan
with the assistance of legal and mediation professionals, if necessary;(4) Grant parents and courts
the widest discretion in developing a parenting plan; and(5) Consider the best interests of the child
and the safety of the parties in developing a parenting plan.
More than a third of Oregon divorces in 2002 involved joint custody. Allen & Brinig, supra note 25.
63
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (G)(3)©, provides for different calculations when a party has custody
or visitation of a child or children for more than 90 days of the year. Custody shares are determined by
dividing the number of days by 365. Shared support need means the presumptive guideline amount of
needed support for the shared child(ren) using the schedule for the combined gross income of the parents
and the number of shared children, multiplied by 1.4. The mother would then pay the shared support need
times the father’s custody share plus the health care and child care paid by mother times her income share.
The two may be offset by subtracting the smaller from the larger.
Section 20-108.1 provides that the guideline amounts may be rebutted by (2) arrangements regarding
custody of the children, including the cost of visitation travel.
Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.2 provides:
B. In determining custody, the court shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the
child. The court shall assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents,
when appropriate, and encourage parents to share in the responsibilities of rearing their children.
As between the parents, there shall be no presumption or inference of law in favor of either. The
court shall give due regard to the primacy of the parent-child relationship but may upon a showing
by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would be served thereby award
custody or visitation to any other person with a legitimate interest. The court may award joint
custody or sole custody.
64
Fennell, supra note 29. See also Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. LAW REV.
1641 (2011) (Threatening, while never intending, an action involving property may cause the other party or
parties to act in a way advantaging the strategist).
65
Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession
Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1986), notes that “the greatest damage from the lack of clarity in the law
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As one might predict from Mnookin and Kornhauser’s stress on bargaining,66 at
the same time as these substantive debates over standards, a growing movement toward
alternative dispute resolution for dispute settlement has both engaged and alarmed the
major players.67 While the ALI’s “replication” parenting time standard has convinced a
limited audience, its reliance on parenting plans has, in some form, surfaced in virtually
every U.S. jurisdiction.68 Many states mandate mediation in disputed custody cases, and
the remainder allow it when the parents wish it or allow judges to refer even recalcitrant
parents to it.69 In the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, a feminist-led objection to the
informality and face-to-face nature of mediation when there was domestic violence70 or
significant power disparities crystalized in exceptions to mandatory—or any other form
of—mediation.71 Still more recently, both judges and other professionals72 have noted
that any kind of default rule disadvantages the children who need the most help, those

occurs in those divorces, the overwhelming majority, that are settled by the parties before trial…To the
extent that it is impossible to get or give sound advice on how a court is likely to resolve a given issue—
and a large measure of discretion means exactly that—the economically stronger party gains negotiating
leverage from the superior ability to prolong negotiation, to engage in expensive pretrial discovery, and to
use preliminary court appearances for harassment.”)
66
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12.
67
See, e.g., Trina R. Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1595-96 (1991); Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women’s Progress on Family Law
Issues,119 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431, 435 (1985); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce
Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992); Martha Shaffer, Divorce Mediation: A
Feminist Perspective, 46 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 162 (1988); Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules
Be Fair?, 35 U.,LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 325, 353 (1996); Margaret F. Brinig, Does Mediation Systematically
Disadvantage Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1995); but see Joan Kelly, Mediated and
Adversarial Divorces: Respondents’ Perceptions of Their Processes and Outcomes, 24 MEDIATION Q. 71,
78 (1989).
68
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at § 2.05 (2002)(“The parenting plan is a core concept of this
Chapter,”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (subd. 9); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234(1); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
336-6-401 et seq.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09, discussed in Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and
Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals, 24
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 65 (1990).
69
One early defense of mediation is Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously, Promoting
Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1985). A collection of the mediation statutes can
be seen in Reporter’s Notes to § 2.07, ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 171-176 (2000), and online updates,
70
For one elaborate set of procedures designed to minimize harm in families with violence, see
Department of Justice, Canada, Making appropriate parenting arrangements in family violence cases:
applying the literature to identify promising practices, available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/fcyfea/lib-bib/rep-rap/2006/2005_3/sum-som.html.
71
See sources cited in note 67, supra. It also causes exceptions to parenting guidelines. See Indiana
Court Rules, Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, Scope, § 1, at 1-2 (2008)(“However, they are not
applicable to situations involving family violence, substance abuse, risk of flight with a child, or any other
circumstances the court reasonably believes endanger the child’s physical health or safety, or significantly
impair the child’s emotional development.”).
72
In the AFCC “think tank,” the non-judicial group included custody evaluators (neutrals appointed
by courts to determine “best interests), lawyers representing victims of domestic violence, especially the
indigent, lawyers who handle high profile custody disputes involving wealthy clients, as well as the mental
health professionals who testify on behalf of mothers or fathers in custody litigation. Of course all these
players, and by definition the judges hearing custody cases, deal with the small percentage who end up in
litigation.
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with parents in conflicted custody proceedings, particularly those with parents of low- or
modest income.73
I have mentioned Mnookin and Kornhauser. At roughly the same time as
divorces reached 50% of first marriages, two scholars, Robert Mnookin and Lewis
Kornhauser, published a path-breaking article in the Yale Law Journal.74 “Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce” immediately became featured reading in
dispute resolution, family law, and, to an only slightly lesser extent, law and economics.
For purposes of this paper, the important points were, first, that legal rules set an
endowment (or starting) point for bargaining at divorce, bargaining that in its essence is
between money (property, alimony and child support) and time with children (custody
and visitation).75 Secondly, they maintained that women were disadvantaged by a
movement toward gender-neutral “best interests of the child” rules76 because they would
trade financial assets to secure what they really valued, time with their children.77 Men
might take advantage of the rules to behave strategically, threatening to ask for custody
when in fact they didn’t really want it (or not as much time as they’d asked for).78
For the past thirty-five years, this bargaining paradigm has dominated the thinking
of scholars who have looked systematically at what was happening during the divorce
process. It has influenced the procedures favored for custody disputes, particularly
because it brought to common understanding the statistic that about 90% were settled
before trial,79 a percentage that has stood up through many empirical tests.80 It was part
73

This was one of the themes at the AFCC think tank. See, e.g., Mary Jean Dolan & Daniel J.
Hyman, An Empirical Critique of the ALI Approximation Rule for Child Custody Disputes, presented at
the 5th Annual Emerging Family Law Scholars and Teachers Conference, Fordham Law School, May 21,
2012; Elrod & Dale, supra note 27, at 384 (2008)(“High conflict parents keep their children and themselves
in perpetual turmoil, consume an extraordinary amount of court services, and deplete their own personal
and financial resources. Secondly, judges find themselves ill prepared to make future predictions about
parents and their children.”); Pamela S. Rudolph, Attachment in Child Custody: An Additive Factor, Not a
Determinative One, 46 Fam. L.Q. 1 (2012).
74
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12. The divorce rate peaked in 1980-81.
75
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 959-60.
76
Id. at 978-79. At the time Mnookin and Kornhauser wrote, many states still had maternal
preference rules, especially for children of “tender years.”
77
I will note that other than the writing of Richard Neely who made claims from his own practice,
no study has found pervasive evidence that such trading did or does go on. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d
357 (W. Va. 1981); Neely, supra note 23, at 177-78;Elster, supra note 2, at 5; Jerry McCant, The Cultural
Contradiction of Fathers as Nonparents, 21 FAM. L.Q. 127, 137 (1987); Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn,
Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455 (1984), Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,
Professional Language and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 161 HARV. L. REV. 727, 76061 (1988); Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American Law Institute
Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Child’s Best Interests, 35 WILLIAMETTE L. REV.
467, 470 (1999), all assume trading of custody time for money takes place. Studies finding no evidence of
trades include ELEANOR MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD 100-03 (1992) (about 10%
of fathers and 7% of mothers asked for more physical custody than they actually wanted, but there was no
indication that this was to extract money); Robert Weiss and Robert Willis, Transfers Among Divorced
Couples: Evidence and Interpretation, 11 J. LAB. ECON. 629 (1993); Brinig & Aleeev, supra note 34.
78
See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 968-71, 972-73.
79
Id. at 955 & n.23. For more recent affirmations, see SANFORD BRAVER & MARY O’CONNELL,
DIVORCED DADS: SHATTERING THE MYTHS 1998; T.K. Logan et al., Divorce, Custody, and Spousal
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of the thinking behind separating the custody portion of dissolutions involving children
from equitable distribution of property, alimony, and child support. While the timing
may just be fortuitous, it is possible that “Bargaining in the Shadow” played a role in
regularizing child support guidelines (thus removing child support to some extent from
the bargaining table).81 The federally mandated and therefore ubiquitous child support
guidelines, most often tie support obligations not only to parental income but also to the
time spent with the child. 82
What I’d like to address here is the role played by Mnookin and Kornhauser’s
central arguments about the law’s setting an endowment point, one in which the
uncertainty of the gender-neutral “best interests” would disfavor women. To flesh out the
logic, we need at least one other step. This point was set not by academics or
legislatures, but by the Supreme Court, ruling in a case about voluntary commitment of
children for inpatient mental health treatment, a case called Parham v. J.R.83 The
essential part of the Court’s reasoning, from my perspective, is that “the law’s concept of
the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience and capacity for judgment” for making difficult decisions. “More important,
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children.”84 In other words, parents are necessary and able to voice their
children’s best interests.
Violence: A Random Sample of Circuit Court Docket Records, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 269 (2003) (Between
78 and 92% settled)
80
See, e.g., Braver, & O’Connell, supra note 79 (2-10% fail to reach settlement); Marygold Melli,
Harold Erlanger & Elizabeth Chambliss, The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the
Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTG. L. REV. 1133, 1142 (1988); Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 36. See
also Joan Hunt & Caridwen Roberts, Child Contact with the Non-Resident Parents, 3 Family Policy
Briefing 1, Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of Oxford, 2004 (10%) available at
http://www.spig.clara.net/reports/hunt.pdf (last visited May 23, 2013); House of Representatives, Standing
Committee on Families and Community Affairs, Every Picture Tells a Story Report of the Inquiry into
Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation 7 & Fig. 1.1 (Parliament of Australia,
2003) (6-7% actually produce a court judgment), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=f
ca/childcustody/report.htm (last visited May 23, 2013).
81
These have been mandated by Congress as part of Title IV of the Social Security Act since the late
1980s. Family Support Act of 1988, P.L. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified throughout 42 U,S.C.); see,
e.g., Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law 2007-2008: Federalization
and Nationalization Continue, 42 FAM. L.Q. 713, 759-60 & Chart 3 (2009). For a discussion on the effect
of various types of guidelines on divorce rates, with examples, see Allen & Brinig, supra note 34. For a
discussion in general of the purposes of child support, see Marsha Garrison, An Evaluation of Two Models
of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41 (1998).
82
Parenting time deductions sometimes begin after a certain threshold number of days or overnights
is reached. Sometimes, as in Arizona, the deductions begin slowly, with as few as three days spent with the
parent with less custodial time, increasing to 50% of the total amount computed in equal time situations. In
some states, and Canada, the total amount due is increased by a multiplier (typically 40% is added to the
original amount) in shared parenting situations before deductions are made, and in a few, only costs that
vary with additional time are counted.
83
442 U.S. 584 (1979). For my own work questioning whether parents are capable of making
difficult choices at divorce or when the other parent dies, see Margaret F. Brinig, Troxel and The Limits of
Community, 32 RUTG. L.J. 733 (2001).
84
442 U.S. at 602. Note that this is in contradiction to the focus in other jurisdictions, begun with
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Art. 12(2), which specifies that the child’s voice must be
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Scott and Emery have looked at what seems to be a stalemate in the legislative
action in terms of gender politics. Another possibility here, which we will consider again
in the empirical section of this paper, is to consider the various goals that can be met with
each kind of interpretation of “best interests.” The three most important goals seem to be
maintenance of stability and continuity, promotion of strong and meaningful relationships
with both parents, and minimizing the child’s exposure to violence and conflict. 85 What
is less clear is which goal is most important, whether any of the three trumps the other
two, and whether a statutory presumption or something like parenting guidelines would
best aid judges in handling contested cases as well as parents bargaining “in the shadow
of the law.”86
The best available studies (long term, using large and representative samples, and
from around the world), show that children are generally disadvantaged by their parents’
divorce. 87 Over the short term this is particularly acute, and can be seen in adjustment
problems, financial difficulties, and distraction on the part of parents. Over the longer
term, most children (probably in the 70% range), are quite resilient.88 Nonetheless
children of divorce tend to delay marriage longer, marry less often, and divorce more
frequently than children of intact families.89
Similarly, it is quite well demonstrated that some dissolving families experience
domestic violence either before parents separate or on a continuing basis.90 The

heard in any jurisdicial and administrative proceeding affecting the child, either directly or through a
representative or an appropriate body. For example, in Great Britain, the Children Act of 1987 and the
Australian Family Law Reform Act of 1995 both give the child the rights and parents responsibilities. The
parental rights perspective is criticized, inter alia, in Linda Henry Elrod, Epilogue: of Families, Federalism
and a Quest for Policy, 39 FAM. L.Q. 843, 846 (1999); David Meyer, Constitutionalization of Family Law,
42 FAM. L.Q. 529 (2008).
85
For an early suggestion that conflict was important to avoid, see Elster, supra note 2.
86
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12. See also Austin Sarat & Wiliam L.F. Felstiner, Law and
Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office 20 L. & SOC. REV. 93, 113 (1986), suggesting that most divorce
lawyers try to get their clients to settle the full range of issues in the case rather than contest them.
87
See, e.g., Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social and
Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, in 15 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: MARRIAGE AND CHILD
WELLBEING 75, 77 (2005)(more behavioral problems, more symptoms of psychological maladjustment,
lower academic achievement, more social difficulties, and poorer self-concepts). See also sources cited in
P. PARKINSON & J. CASHMORE, supra note 48, at 1 & n.4.
88
See, E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED (2003);
JUDITH S., WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY: THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25
YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000) and PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING
UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (1997).
89
See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, “I Only Want Trust’: Norms, Trust and
Autonomy, 32 JOURNAL OF SOCIO-ECONOMICS 471 (2003); Marriage and Divorce in the United States, see
generally Casey E. Copen et al., First Marriages in the United States: Data From the 2006–2010 National
Survey of Family Growth, 49 National Health Statistics Reports, Mar. 22, 2012 (likelihood of divorcing,
page 7; marrying page 12 & Table 1; marrying older at 14 & Table 3, all based on presence or absence of
both parents in household at age 14).
90
See Shannon Catalino, Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2010, Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Fact Sheet (Nov.27, 2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf;
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proportion is disputed, but seems to be higher among those who never married than those
who do.91 When children are exposed to violence (either between their parents or
directed at themselves), no one doubts that they are harmed. 92 Psychologists and
sociologists write that families with a high degree of visible conflict are those in which
children might even do better if their parents divorce than if the parents stay together.93
Along the same lines, some parents (how many is contested) are not fit to be
regular caretakers for children, usually because they are involved with substance abuse,
abuse of children or mental illness.94 (Some might be institutionalized in a variety of
settings.) However, the vast majority are fit to be custodians.

(The data were developed from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) National Crime Victimization
Survey (NCVS), which annually collects information on nonfatal victimizations reported and not reported
to the police against persons age 12 or older from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households.
The report shows a declining rate from 1994 to 2010, from 9.8 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older to 3.6 per
1000. Females living in households comprised of one female adult with children experienced intimate
partner violence at a rate more than 10 times higher than households with married adults with children. Id.
at 2 & Table 1.) Linda Girdner, Custody Mediation in the United States: Empowerment or Social Control?
3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 134, 138 & n.19 (1989)(reporting that a Canadian study shows physical violence
given as reason for marital separation by 50-75% of women); DEMIE KURZ, FOR RICHER, FOR POORER: FOR
RICHER, FOR POORER: MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE (1995)(about 30%); Allen & Brinig, supra note 27,
at313 & Table 1 (2011) (.26 (before 1997) to .21 (1998-2002) of random selection of divorce cases in
Oregon involving children alleged domestic violence).
91
See, e.g., Amanda Berger et al., Relationship Violence Among Young Adult Couples, Child
Trends Research Brief 2012-14 (2101), available at http://www.childtrends.org/Files/Child_Trends2012_06_01_RB_CoupleViolence.pdf (highest level among cohabiting couples, lowest among married
couples, counting any type of violence and surveying both partners, 45% of married couples and 52% of
cohabiting couples experienced violence; for those resulting in injury, 8% of married couples and 15% of
cohabiting). This seems to be true in Spain and Great Britain as well.
92
See, e.g., AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 88 (suggesting that children are only better off if their
parents had a highly conflictual marriage before divorce, a case that occurs only about 30% of the time);
and, more recently, E. MARK CUMMINGS & PATRICK T. DAVIES, MARITAL CONFLICT AND CHILDREN: AN
EMOTIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE vii-viii (2010); Rena Repetti, Shelley E. Taylor & Theresa E. Seeman,
Risky families: Family & Social Environments and the Mental and Physical Health of Offspring, 128
PSYCH. BULL. 330 (2002); ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 100 (2012)
(“Hundreds of studies show that parental conflict is toxic for children in divorce”); E. Mark Cummings,
Christine Merrilees & Melissa Ward George, Fathers, Marriages, And Families: Revisiting And Updating
The Framework For Fathering In Family Context, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT
154 (5th ed., Michael E. Lamb, ed. 2010). See also Nuffield Report, supra note 27, at xii, xiii (ongoing
conflict leads to poor relationships with parents in adulthood, as does absence of non-residential parent’s
emotional investment in the child’s life).
93
For some examples, See Paul Amato & Alan Booth, A Prospective Study of Parental Divorce and
Parent-Child Relationships, 58 J. MARR & FAM. 356 (1996); Susan Jekielek, Parental Conflict, Marital
Disruption and Children’s Emotional Well-Being, 76 SOCIAL FORCES 905 (1998); Donna Morrison & Mary
Jo Coiro, Parental Conflict and Marital Disruption: Do Children Benefit When High-Conflict Marriages
are Dissolved, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 626 (1999); Alan Booth & Paul Amato, Parental Pre-Divorce
Relations and Offspring Post-Divorce Well-Being, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 197, 210 (2001).
94
One study indicates that this number is between 8 and 15% than JANET JOHNSTON, VIVIENNE
ROSEBY, KATHRYN KUEHNLE , IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD: UNDERSTANDING AND HELPING CHILDREN OF
CONFLICTED AND VIOLENT DIVORCE. New York: Springer. 2009. See Linda Neilson, Shared residential
custody: Review of the Research, AM. J. FAM. L. 4 (January, 2013).
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There is no dispute over the fact that there are tremendous costs involved in
litigated custody disputes.95 These costs can be seen in court time (and resources),96 the
cost of the conflict to the child, the costs to each parent (financially, emotionally and
socially),97 and the costs of their continuing to have to deal with each other in nonpositive ways, especially in cases involving domestic violence. 98 As we have seen, there
are also costs of uncertainty in deciding what’s best for children.
Further, and not surprisingly, parents are enormously invested in their children. It
may be slightly less obvious that loss of custody involves real harm (not just pretended or
imagined harm) to them.99 As two-parent families with loving parents are best for
children (biological or adoptive), continuing relationships with two nurturing parents
(biological or adoptive) who no longer live together is typically the second-best
solution.100
At this juncture in time, professionals contest more than just percentages of time
that should be allocated to each parent. Some claim that “relationship” equals “parenting
time”101 and, “nurturing” necessarily involves overnight stays. Some claim that the
“Tragically, a small, but significant, number of parents engage in a type of guerilla warfare,
litigating repeatedly, clogging courts and harming their children.” Elrod & Dale, supra note 27, at 388
(Citing MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE LEGAL BATTLE AND
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1999). The article concludes that “if it does not reduce conflict, it will not
be in the best interests of children.” Id. at 418.; E. MACCOBY & R. MNOOKIN, supra note 78, at 100, 159
(1992); Constance Ahrons, The Good Divorce 56 (1994); JANET R. JOHNSTON & VIVIENNE ROSEBY, IN THE
NAME OF THE CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND HELPING CHILDREN 4
(1977).
96
See, e.g., Kyle Pruett & Marsha Kline Pruett, Eds., CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA: CHILD CUSTODY (1998). Experts will most clearly be needed when there is
strategic behavior. There have been critics of their over-use in the past, that they have just increased the
costs and given judges an excuse to do whatever they’d like anyway, that they can offer little because so
much is contested or the research weak, and so forth.
97
Many of these costs are enumerated in Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12.
98
See, e.g., Merle H. Weimer, Domestic Violence and Custody: Importing The American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution Into Oregon Law, 35 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 643,
645 (1998)(noting the attention paid to domestic violence in what was then a draft). More recently, see,
e.g., Katherine M. Reihing, Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence and Their Children After Divorce:
The American Law Institute’s Model, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393, 398 (1999); Jennifer L.
Hardesty and Lawrence H. Ganong, How Women Make Custody Decisions and Manage Co-Parenting with
Abusive Former Husbands,23 J. SOC. & PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 543 (2006).
http://www.childtrends.org/Files/Child_Trends-2012_06_01_RB_CoupleViolence.pdf
99
Brinig & Nock, ,supra note 84 (noncustodial fathers, holding constant all available other factors,
have a real and significant increase in depressive symptoms following a custody order giving it to the
mother).
100
See, e.g., “This paper starts from the viewpoint that evidence fully supports the benefit to children
of having a meaningful relationship with both parents after separation.” University of Oxford, Department
of Social Policy and Intervention, Caring for children after parental separation: would legislation for shared
parenting time help children? (May, 2011). See also Nuffield Report, supra note 27, at xii.
101
See, e.g., William B. Fabricius, Karina R. Sokol, Priscila Diaz & Sanford L. Braver, Parenting
Time, Parent Conflict, Parent-Child Relationships, and Children’s Physical Health, in PARENTING PLAN
EVALUATIONS: APPLIED RESEARCH FOR THE FAMILY COURT 188, 193-94 (K. Juehnle & L. Drozl, eds.
2012) (claiming that time is a necessary agreement for cultivating meaningful relationships); contra Paul R.
Amato, & Joan G. Gilbreth, Non-Resident Fathers And Children’s Wellbeing: A Meta-Analysis, 61 J.
95
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confusion caused by moving between two households outweighs the benefit, at least for
some.102 There is debate about whether the “continuing relationship with two nurturing
parents” trumps or is trumped by the child’s need for continuity and stability.103 Experts
do not agree whether exceptions to alternating custody need to be made when it’s
impracticable (say, for a nursing or infant child,104 or one with disabilities, or when a
parent is in the armed forces, or lives too far away, or both are poor).105
Examining the various perspectives in turn, we come first to the child, who is the
center of dispute between (we will assume) fit and loving parents, will be advantaged by
the complementarity of the two parents involved,106 as well as by the continuity and
MARRIAGE & FAM. 557 (1999), who review 63 studies on parent–child contact and children’s well-being
finding that the quality of contact is more important than the frequency of contact. Good outcomes for
children were more likely when non-resident fathers had positive relationships with their children and had
an ‘active parenting’ approach, including both warmth and setting boundaries. See also Brinig, supra note
27 (finding that overnights not statistically related to wellbeing, but “closeness” to non-custodial father
was); Nuffield Report, supra note 25, at xii-xiii (overnights not strongly associated with positive
experiences of closeness); those with more frequent contact had very close pre-separation relationships, but
overnights not a significant factor). No blueprint works for all or even a majority of cases, id. at xiii-xiv.
102
See, e.g., Juliana M. Sobowlewski & Paul R. Amato, Parents' Discord and Divorce, Parent-Child
Relationships and Subjective Well-Being in Early Adulthood: Is Feeling Close to Two Parents Always
Better than Feeling Close to One?,85 SOCIAL FORCES 1105, 1118 (2007).
103
See, e.g., Pruett and DiFonzio, supra note 11, at 158 (1). One common place for this debate to
play out is in “move away” cases. In the move-away context, see the rule enunciated in a California case:
“Once the trial court has entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular custodial
arrangement is in the best interest of the child, “the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody
arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional
bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining” that custody arrangement.
(Burgess, supra, 13 Cal. 4th 25, at 32–33, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473.) In re Marriage of Brown &
Yana, 37 Cal. 4th 947, 956, 127 P.3d 28, 32 (2006) notes that parental happiness is a lesser concern than
either of the other two.
104
For arguments that shared parenting of infants involving overnight stays is not appropriate, see
Jennifer McIntosh, Bruce Smyth, Margaret Kelaher & Yvonne Wells, Post separation parenting
arrangements: outcomes for infants and children. Sydney, Australia: Australian Government. 2010,
available at
http://www.familytransitions.com.au/Family_Transitions/Family_Transitions_files/Post%20Separation%20
parenting%20arrangements%20and%20developmental%20outcomes%20for%20children%20%26%20infa
nts%202010.pdf; R. EMERY, supra note 90, at 118-19 (2010); Tornello et al., supra note 38 For a balanced
discussion of both attachment and balanced parenting perspectives, See Marsha Kline Pruett, Jennifer E.
McIntosh and Joan B. Kelly, Parental Separation and Overnight Care of Young Children, Part I:
Consensus Through Theoretical and Empirical Integration, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 240, 242-47 (2014).
105
For a judicial perspective, see Gerald R. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s
Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 201, 212-13 (1998):
Further, joint custody is a more expensive proposition than sole custody. Joint custodians are each
required to maintain suitable housing for children, with extra clothing and toys. It has been
estimated that these expenditures constitute from one-fourth to one-third of the total child-related
expenditures. Initially, there is the question of whether the costs associated with joint custody
make such arrangements feasible for low-income families. One study noted that joint custody is
not spreading very quickly to lower socio-economic populations. Reviewing the literature, one is
left with the feeling that joint custody is an upper-middle class phenomenon.
Such considerations are relevant to young adults whose parents separated. Nuffield Report, supra note 27,
at xviii.
106
See, e.g., Ira Lupu. The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1117 (1994). This is not the same as the contention made by some in the same-sex marriage movement

20

stability of whatever arrangement is reached. Some research from Australia shows
advantage from the child’s being considered—being heard—even though other
considerations make up the final decision.107
The fit parents primarily (assuming Parham is correct) seek to maximize the
benefits and long-term happiness of the child. They may also seek some sort of just
compensation for their past sacrifices or recognition for the roles they have played, in
sociological terms, as father or mother. They may very much value the societal trust
given to their parenting, particularly at a time when their trust in their own spouse or
partner is at low ebb.108 To a lesser extent, they may consider the feelings of the other
parent, either in terms of revenge or possibly beneficence. Note again that they are
unable to use damages (property compensation) to offset losses of parenting, either
because they are constrained by statutes, have little property, or because compensation
won’t suffice.
Society’s interests at separation are to discover and further the “best interests” of
the particular child while minimizing strategic behavior by parents, as well as the various
kinds of costs noted already. Of course there are difference between looking case-bycase (“ex post”), when we are more interested in the first societal interest and long term
(“ex ante”), when we are more interested in the set of costs. This long-term role is the
typical role for policy makers and academics and may be one reason we have focused on
the bargaining, rather than the litigating, share of disputes.
In sum, at the present time, courts, legislatures, family lawyers, therapists, and
interest groups are all focused on changing or maintaining the standards used to
determine how to devise the best rules for children whose parents no longer live
together.109 The pressure of the arguments has increased to the point where in January of
2013 the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts called a meeting (complete with
a facilitator to handle disputes) to see whether any rapprochement between the various
players (including some from Canada and Australia) could be made using the available
scientific evidence.110 Although the divorce rate in the United States has continued to fall

debate that men and women are complementary in marriage. See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage: What
it Is, Why it Matters, and the Consequences of Redefining It, Heritage Foundation, available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/marriage-what-it-is-why-it-matters-and-theconsequences-of-redefining-it.
107
McIntosh et al., supra note 104.
108
Brinig and Nock, supra note 89.
109
There is virtual consensus, both among academics and legislatures, that joint decision-making (or
“joint legal custody”) tends to produce preferable results for fit parents in most situations. All U.S. statutes
now allow it, and many have strong presumptions that it is appropriate. For a chart listing these, Elrod &
Spector, supra note 81, at 758 & Chart 2 (2009). This piece, however, considers shared parenting time, or
joint physical custody. The facilitator was Bernard Mayer of Notre Dame’s KROC Institute for
International Peace Studies.
110
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Shared Parenting Think Tank, Closing the Gap:
Research, Practice, Policy and Shared Parenting, Chicago, IL, Jan. 24-26, 2013. A final report was
published in the April, 2014 issue of Family Court Review, as Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 11, and the
special issue also includes various subgroup reports.
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since its peak in 1981, so that it is just about what it was in 1970,111 family dissolution
disputes involving children continue to increase. That is so because the unwed birth rate
has risen dramatically since 1960, so that in 2010 it was about 41%,112 and unmarried
couples, who do not of course divorce, are not as stable as their married counterparts.113
Presumptions in some ways seem the ideal way of moving from the over-flexible
best interests standard to a situation facilitating bargaining without straitjacketing courts.
They would seem to maximize the possibility that all the goals of the custody proceeding
can be met. However, custody presumptions, like absolute rules, require that most
separating families be fundamentally alike, since, like rules, they act to “pool” parenting
situations. However, families with children differ along many important dimensions even
when parents are “fit,” meaning that their abilities to parent will not typically be
questioned or interfered with by the state.114

How parents are not alike
Parents are not alike, though literature says all happy families may be. 115 They
differ in easily observable and measurable ways as well as more subtle, psychological
ones. The very differences between parents in intact families may aid children,116 though
these same differences may make growing up more challenging for children whose
parents no longer live together.117
The academic literature has discussed some of these differences, and how they
may make the typical “one size fits all,” or in Ayres/Mitts terminology, “pooling”
approach of legal regulation difficult at best, counterproductive at worst.118 The data we
have obtained from Arizona court records allows us to trace the influence of some, but
not all, of these differences.
In work using the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health, Brinig and
Nock noted racial differences in the impact of legal status (their parents’ marriage or
See, e.g., Dana Rotz, Why Have Divorce Rates Fallen? The Role of Women’s Age at Marriage,
2012 (under review); Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their
Driving Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2007).
112
National Vital Statistics Report 61(1) (Aug. 12,,2012), Births: Final Data for 2010, Table C,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr61/nvsr61_01.pdf (40.8%)
113
M.D. Bramlett & W.D. Mosher, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage in the United
States. National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Health. Stat. 23(33)(2002), available from
hppt://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf. (The probability of a cohabiting relationship
lasting even five years is 51%, compared to 80% for marriage.)
114
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV 2401 (1995).
115
LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (1878) (““All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is
unhappy in its own way.”)
116
Lupu, supra note 106.
117
ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCE
(New York: Crown Pubs. 2005)
118
See, e.g., Bartlett,supra note 78, at 468 (1999)(one-size-fits-all produces lousy results for some
individual children).
111
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formal adoption) on various groups of children. The bottom line was that for some U.S.
children, marriage (rather than staying together) affects wellbeing in numerous ways. For
others, if their parents live together it does not seem to matter whether they are married or
not.119 Similarly, for most children, living in a birth or adoptive family is far preferable
to living in an informal family with kin. For African-American children, living with kin
is virtually indistinguishable from adoption or living with biological parents. 120 (For all
children, living with foster parents is the least preferable situation,121 though whether it is
the foster families or the events leading to placement that is problematic is not revealed
by the data.)
Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979), Brinig documented
differences in responses to varying parenting styles following the patterns of Baumrind122
and Maccoby and Martin,123 finding, consistent with other literature124 that AfricanAmerican children responded more favorably to authoritarian parenting than did majority
children, who had better results with either authoritative or permissive parenting styles.
In Israel, Dwairy and Dor125 have noted that different immigrant groups to Israel seem to
do better under different parenting styles, while Mayseless and coauthors126 have found
best adaptation to the Israeli military following authoritative parenting. All these studies
can be taken to caution lawmakers from assuming that policies directed at families will
always have the same results, even when implemented in good faith. While we cannot
directly measure parenting style given our data here, we can detect any differences
Hispanic culture makes, because a number of the separating parents in the Arizona
sample who are self-or other identified as Hispanic.127
Other observable characteristics that might make differences include income,
whether the parents had ever married, whether either parent displayed signs of alcohol or
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The One-Size Fits All Family, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1371 (2009)
Margaret F. Brinig and Steven L. Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter? Adoption by Kin
Caregivers, 36 Fam. L.Q. 449, 463 (2002).
121
Id. at 462-63.
122
Diana Baumrind, The Influence of Parenting Style on Adolescent Competence and Substance Use,
11 J. Adolescence 56 (1991)
123
Eleanor Maccoby & Martin, Sociology in the Context of the Family: Parent-Child Interaction, In
P.H. Mussen (Series Ed.) & E.M. Hetherington (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of Child Psychology (vol. 4):
Socialization, Personality, and Social Development (pp. 1-101). New York: Wiley.
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Beau Abar, Keith L. Carter & Adam Winsler, The Effects of Maternal Parenting Style and
Religious Commitment on Self-Regulation and Achievement and Risk Behavior Among African-American
Parochial College Students, 32 J Adolescence 759 (2009)
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Marwen Dwairy & Asnat Dor, Parenting and Psychological Adjustment of Adolescent Immigrants
in Israel, 23 J. Fam. Psych. 416 (2009).
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Ofra Mayseless, Miri Scharf, & Michel Sholt, (2003). From authoritative parenting practices to an
authoritarian context: Exploring the person-environment fit. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 13(4),
427-456
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In some cases, one or the other of the parents still had homes in Mexico, was currently living
there, or had married there. In others, the divorce records had forms answered in Spanish, or featured
hearings requiring an interpreter. In some of those with protective orders or bench warrants, the assailant
or victim was identified as Hispanic in police reports. Finally, in some we followed Census methods, using
the probabilities from the list of most common Hispanic surnames weighted by the Hispanic percentage
population in the census tract.
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drug abuse or mental illness, whether the relationship was characterized by domestic
violence, and whether the child was an infant at the time of separation. Indications that
courts were dealing with the less favorable of these types of families might indicate that
absent agreement, a court should not award equal or even substantially shared
parenting.128 A number of prior studies, most notably the recent one done by Melli and
coauthor in Wisconsin,129 indicate that equal or substantially shared parenting is most
common in wealthy couples.130 On the contrary, many jurisdictions disallow substantial
custody to be awarded the perpetrator of domestic violence,131 while most place
substantial restrictions or supervision requirements on parents who abuse substances or
whose mental illness may endanger themselves or the child. 132 Even many advocates of
shared parenting in general hesitate to endorse it when children are infants.133
Other possible differences that can be measured in the Arizona data include the way
the parenting plan was reached, whether by default, consent, or after contested court
hearing.134 Most of the early studies of joint custody success involve parents who opted
into shared parenting either before separation or fairly early in the divorce process.135
One might expect these couples to be more successful as co-parents than those parents
who each initially favored sole custody awards to themselves or who are otherwise
unable to settle the incidents of divorce.136 Most of the statutes listing factors for when
128

See, e.g., Peter Jaffe, A Presumption Against Shared Parenting for Family Court Litigants, 52
FAM. CT. REV. 187, 188, 191 (2014).
129
Melli & Brown, supra note 49; Judi Bartfeld, Shared Placement: An Overview of Prevalence,
Trends, Economic Implications, and Impacts on Child Well-Being, University of Wisconsin Institute on
Poverty, 2011. See also Suzanne Reynolds, Ralph Peoples & Catherine Harris, Back to the Future: An
Empirical Study of Child Custody Outcomes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1629 (2007).
130
There is also evidence that parents with substantial higher education may favor equal or joint
parenting, though this characteristic is highly correlated with income.
131
See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 9-13-101©(2); Idaho Code § 320717B(5); Minn. Stat. § 518.17 subd. 2.
132
See, e.g., WIS. STAT 767.41 (5)(am) (14); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 2.13.
133
See Pruett & DiFonzio, supra note 9, at 162:
Embedded within the shared parenting research is a hotbed of controversy on the question of
overnights for fathers with very young children who do not primarily reside with them. As
indicated, early paternal involvement serves as a protective factor for later father–child
relationships. Yet the primacy of attachment research paradigms for mapping the pathway to
healthy development has led to dyadic considerations of security and stability that have, until very
recently, excluded the father or other caregiver. The emphasis on assisting parents through a
conflict-laden transition, while their children’s brains and minds are developing rapidly and in
need of consistent nurturance and support in order to develop physiological and biological
regulation and trust in the world around them, can pit the uncoupling family’s dynamics in direct
opposition to the child’s capacities and needs.
See also Marsha Kline Pruett, Jennifer E. McIntosh & Joan B. Kelly, Parental Separation and Overnight
Care of Young Children, Part I: Consensus Through Theoretical and Empirical Integration, 52 FAM. CT.
REV. 240 (2014) (suggesting that for young children the decision needs to be individualized); Indiana
Parenting Time Guidelines, supra note 69; also Tornello et al., supra note 38 Some of the debate among
researchers seems to emanate from differences in their belief in attachment theory.
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A final variation, inconsistently titled by the two observed courts, is that the arrangement was
negotiated by attorneys and confirmed in the final court hearing.
135
An exception is Robert E. Emery, Sheila G. Matthews and Katherine M. Kitzman, Child Custody
Mediation and Litigation: Parents' Satisfaction and Functioning One Year After Settlement, 62 J.
CONSULT. & CLINICAL PSYCH. 124 (1994).
136
See also Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 9, at 154.
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joint physical custody is appropriate mention distance.137 While children may be able to
flourish moving between two households in the same neighborhood and school district,
keeping their friends and classrooms constant, equal parenting becomes increasingly
difficult as parents are located at greater distances. Frequent contact with both parents,
one of the goals of many of the statutes,138 is impossible once travel takes more than a
couple of hours.
II.

Herding and Separating Models in the Context of Child Custody.

This article began with the observation that law professor Ian Ayres and attorney
Joshua Mitts write that traditional regulatory schemes, imposing across-the-board
mandates to regulate externalities, move behavior from many simply mimicking others to
a new, mandated pool. They argue that this can be less useful for society than a system
where regulation induces separating behaviors, since pooling suppresses the production
of information and may exacerbate systemic risk. The information-production function
suppressed by pooling can otherwise steer both private and public actors toward better
evidence-based outcomes.139
The Arizona law in place at the beginning of my study was typical of the rules in
many states “friendly” to joint parenting, allowing mimicking rather than more strongly
channeling shared parenting.140 The state moved in 2010141 and again in 2012142
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For some examples, see WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09187(3)(b); ALA. CODE § 30-3152(a)(5)(geographic proximity of parents to each other as this relates to the practical considerations of
joint physical custody); N.MEX. STAT. § 40-4-91B(7)(“geographic distance between the parties’
residences”); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)(a)(2).
138
See, e.g., TEX. CODE ANN §153.0001( a)(1)(“frequent and continuing”); VA. CODE § 20124.2(B)(“frequent and continuing”), Wis. Stat. §767.41 (regularly occurring and meaningful periods of
physical placement to provide predictability and stability”)
139
Ayres and Mitts, supra note 1, at 3.
140
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25–403.01. Sole and joint custody
A. In awarding child custody, the court may order sole custody or joint custody. This section does
not create a presumption in favor of one custody arrangement over another. The court in
determining custody shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex.
B. The court may issue an order for joint custody over the objection of one of the parents if the
court makes specific written findings of why the order is in the child's best interests. In determining
whether joint custody is in the child's best interests, the court shall consider the factors prescribed in
section 25–403, subsection A and all of the following:
1. The agreement or lack of an agreement by the parents regarding joint custody.
2. Whether a parent's lack of agreement is unreasonable or is influenced by an issue not related to
the best interests of the child.
3. The past, present and future abilities of the parents to cooperate in decision-making about the
child to the extent required by the order of joint custody.
4. Whether the joint custody arrangement is logistically possible.
C. The court may issue an order for joint custody of a child if both parents agree and submit a
written parenting plan and the court finds such an order is in the best interests of the child. The
court may order joint legal custody without ordering joint physical custody.
Child Custody, 2005 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 45 (S.B. 1045) (West).
141
Laws 2010, Ch. 186, § 2.
142
Laws 2012, Ch. 309, § 8, eff. Jan. 1, 2013
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progressively toward mandating equal parenting for all separating couples.143 Arizona as
a whole even in 2007 had more equal parenting than most other jurisdictions,144 and
Maricopa County, the most populous in the state, led the way and drives the state-level
results.145 In other words, by imitating others, the majority of couples not having trialdetermined custody outcomes, chose some degree of joint parenting, and the most
frequently occurring single outcome was equal or nearly equal parenting.146 The figure
also shows peaks or concentrations at various other points, though these may be due to
incentives driven by the shared custody deductions of the child support system.

143

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403.02 now includes in part:
B. Consistent with the child's best interests in § 25-403 and §§ 25-403.03, 25-403.04 and
25-403.05, the court shall adopt a parenting plan that provides for both parents to share legal
decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting time. The
court shall not prefer a parent's proposed plan because of the parent's or child's gender.
144
SEE PATRICK PARKINSON, THE PAYOFFS AND PITFALLS OF LAWS THAT ENCOURAGE SHARED
PARENTING: LESSONS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE, 13 (2014). North Carolina in 2006 had 15.3%
of cases with at least 123 days of parenting time (33%), Reynolds et al., supra note 29, at1667 (2006-07);
Oregon, in 2002, had 32% of joint custody according to MARGARET F. BRINIG, LAW, FAMILY AND
COMMUNITY: SUPPORTING THE COVENANt 89 & Fig. 2.1 (2010); Wisconsin had 43.8% with at least 30%
parenting time in 2007, according to Bartfeld, supra note 129 (2011); Washington in 2007 had 16% equal
and another 18% over 35% according to Thomas George, Residential Time Summary Reports Filed in
Washington July 2007-March 2008, Olympia: Washington State Center for Court Research, available at
www.courts.wa.gov/wsccv/docs/ResidentialTimeSummaryReport.pdf; Arizona in 2007 had 15% equal
custody, and another 19% with at least 116 days, according to Venohr & Kaunelis, Arizona Child Support
Guideline Review: Analysis of Case File Data. Denver: Center for Policy Research, available at
www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/CSGRC/repository/2009-CaseFileRev.pdf.
145
Because Maricopa’s population is so much larger than any other county in the state, its custody
numbers drive the state averages. Pima’s (and presumably other counties’) are skewed to the left, the lower
amounts. Pima’s totals were slightly different (added up to only 91%) because of a large number of cases
in which no parenting time reduction was ordered. These do not show up on the figure (which begins at 420 days).
146
The various spikes in the figure correspond, by definition, to frequently occurring parenting
patterns. While the 182 day pattern is obvious (though it may be through alternating weeks or seasons, or
2-2-5-5 day patterns), the spike around 60 days accounts for traditional custody arrangements (every other
weekend (52 days) plus one week during the summer (4.75 additional days). The 104 day pattern is for one
parent to have the children during the school week with the other living with them on weekends (or, in long
distance situations, one having most of summer vacation plus the longer breaks during the school year).
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Sometimes, as Ayres and Mitts point out, moving from mandatory (such as the rule
all mothers got custody under a tender years presumption) to a default (joint parenting)
will induce more separation, that is, a smoother distribution across all the points. The
authors’ illustration is that with home schooling as an exception from compulsory public
or private education, there will be more experimentation.147 Ayres and Mitts suggest that
such defaults may induce separation when there is no regulatory transparency. This
would be true in the custody situation only if all decisions were kept confidential.
Clearly each judge knows his or her past decisions (and almost certainly is attempting to
apply the law in a consistent way). 148 But every attorney also knows what has happened
with clients, and attorney CLE courses and other meetings facilitate the spread of general
custody patterns as well as what worked in a particular kind of case.149 The talk spread in
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Private schooling was constitutionally permitted as an option in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
Homeschooling became increasingly popular following Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(allowingAmish parents to be exempt from compulsory education through age 16 in order to pursue the
home-based vocational education commensurate with their religious tradition).
148
This prior tendency/self-knowledge would be evidenced in written opinions, but these are highly
unlikely in family law matters precisely because of the discretion accorded to trial court judges. The class
of cases in which the judge’s tendency to “clump” might occur is those decided by the court, in Maricopa
known as DDI, or decree of dissolution after trial. The judges, of course, might be influenced by many
things, including, according to a recent study (that only observed the tendency in women’s rights cases)
whether they have daughters. Glynn, Adam, and Maya Sen. 2014. Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does
Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?. American Journal of Political Science. Copy
at http://j.mp/NzXAEG.
149
This herding effect would be most pronounced in those cases decided by consent, termed by
Maricopa Consent Decrees of Dissolution. In Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12, terminology, these
would be bargains reached “in the shadow of the law.” In an online survey taken in May, 2014, of
members of the family law section of the state bar in Maricopa, with 57 responses, the changes made to the
law in 2013 would primarily affect judges’ decisions, not what they advised their clients, and then only
make a difference to fathers seeking equal custody. More than half (52.6%) answered that the change made
no or minimal change in the way their clients would reach parenting time decisions. The same survey
revealed that two-thirds (66.7%) felt that the new law would make at least a moderate difference to judges
deciding contested custody cases. The number of fathers who would likely be successful in obtaining equal
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divorced and single parents’ support groups or just among casual friends also may induce
people to follow trends like shared parenting.150 In such cases, where others’ practices
are known, Ayres and Mitts show how Bayesian decisionmaking will induce pooling, as
actors “find it individually more rational to mimic the tried-and-seemingly-true behavior
of others rather than to take the road less traveled.151
Ayres and Mitts write at greatest length152 about the tendency of pooling
regulations to increase the chance of systemic risk.153 There is no exact analog in the
custody world, where individual failures are the legal concern.154 However, to the extent
that racial and cultural groups, or lower income families, are disadvantaged by particular
parenting arrangements, the exacerbation of income inequalities would present a major
problem.155 This type of systemic risk is what some of the results in Arizona seem to
portend.156 There is also the possibility, discussed elsewhere157 and therefore left to the
side here, that the shared custody presumption is internally a bad choice

parenting time (81.7%) following the law was much greater than prior to the law (47.3%). Survey
responses available on request to author.
150
For one thoughtful discussion of social norms, see Richard C. McAdams, Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 339 (2000). For the original paper coining the term “norm entrepreneurs,”
see Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). Arguably the divorced
fathers groups have played major roles in moving norms toward joint parenting.
151
Ayres & Mitts, supra note 1, at 4.
152
See also Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Three Proposals for Regulating the Distribution of Home
Equity, 31 YALE J. ON REG. – (2014).
153
See their Figure 2 on page 6. Note the similarity with the bunching in Arizona at parenting times
of 39-57 days (.05% subtraction from child support according to Appendix A, 88-115 days (16.1%
subtraction from child support); and 173-82 days (48.6% subtraction, or 50% under Schedule B).
154
There has been much concern about a particular kind of systemic risk, that dealing with interracial
placement of children, which might adversely affect the racial minority groups themselves. For a
consideration of this risk, see Margaret F. Brinig, Book Review, The Child’s Best Interests: A Neglected
Perspective on Interracial Intimacies, 117 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 2129 (2004).
155
For a discussion of this problem in the context of marriage, see JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN,
MARRIAGE MARKETS (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014).
156
Depending upon the success of shared parenting, there may be a risk from its under-use by less
advantaged or cultural minority families. That is, if children of separating parents do much better when
their parents share parenting, whole groups of children are at risk. On the other hand, if income inequality
between parents presents special problems for equal-parenting separated couples because of faulty
assumptions behind the child support guidelines, there could be another unhappy systemic effect that would
only be worth the cost if the benefits of coparenting outweighed the documented risks of growing up (at
least partially) in poverty. As far as I know, no research has been done on growing up in two households,
one of which is far poorer than the other. This result was certainly not the goal of the child support
guidelines, and in some jurisdictions (Canada, for example), is expressly what is being avoided by very
generous awards to the lower income parent. See Allen & Brinig, supra note 34, at 146-47(2011).
157
Brinig, Penalty Defaults, supra note 10.
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Ayres and Mitts say that pooling may result if “the cost of altering the default is
sufficiently high.”158 In the custody context, this may well be the case with the latest
version of the statute, which requires the judge to order a parenting plan that maximizes
the parenting time for both parents. In order to deviate from the statute, the judge would
presumably have to list specific reasons under the other sections (such as domestic
violence) that such an order is not appropriate.159 While Arizona law restricts joint legal
decisionmaking (joint legal custody) in cases of domestic violence, a finding that
domestic violence occurred does not necessarily affect the decision that the parties should
share parenting time, and a decision affecting parenting time would require a (high cost,
in terms of court time, legal fees, missed work and emotional energy)160 additional
hearing and a finding that substantial parenting time would endanger the child.161 Ayres
and Mitts repeat the familiar modern portfolio theory, which presupposes that distribution
across different investments reduces the chance of correlation among them and thus of
failure given market loss.162 However Ayres and Mitts extend the theory in successive
sections to biodiversity and ecosystem stability,163 genetic variation and population
survival,164 and even types of political regimes (democratic and dictatorial types were
158

Ayres and Mitts, supra note 1, at 8 & fn. 14.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(B) provides:
B. In a contested legal decision-making or parenting time case, the court shall make specific
findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the
best interests of the child.
160
See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12 at 971-72.
161
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403.01 provides:
D. A parent who is not granted sole or joint legal decision-making is entitled to reasonable
parenting time to ensure that the minor child has substantial, frequent, meaningful and continuing
contact with the parent unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time would endanger
the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health.
162
Ayres & Mitts, supra note 1, at 11.
163
Id. at 11-13.
164
Id. at 13-15 (where variation in the variation, or kurtosis, is essential to systemic stability given
unexpected shocks to the system).
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both needed to repel Hitler’s Nazi invasion).165 In modern pluralistic families, a variety
of parenting arrangements accommodate parents who live and work in a variety of
settings.166
Much of the rest of Ayres and Mitts’ paper is devoted to consideration of the
benefits of separating equilibria for generating information and for experimentation, and
this application of their theory seems to apply most closely to shared custody
presumptions. They maintain that “diversity permits learning of better outcomes in
alternative states of the world.”167 One of the historic problems with sweeping legal rules
in the family area is that their effects often are not measured,168 or are not measured in
scientifically valid ways before they are copied.169 In particular, in many of the papers
supporting joint parenting, families opted into the arrangement, or the groups studied
were very small or in particular geographic areas. Much less research supports the
success of laws defaulting to substantial or equal co-parenting among divorcing
families170 (let alone families who never married and may never have lived together).171
165

Id. at 25-16.
Thus Maria Cancian et al., Who Gets Custody. Now? Dramatic Changes in Children's Living
Arrangements After Divorce, DEMOGRAPHY (forthcoming 2014) note that shared parenting is much more
likely to be chosen (by parties or judges) in Wisconsin counties other than the most urban, Milwaukee,
which also boasts the greatest minority populations.
167
Ayres & Mitts, supra note 1, at 16.
168
As Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 11, at 161:
For example, areas of research with strong supporting bodies elucidate both the harm to children
due to continued exposure to parental conflict, and the important protective factor of positive
quality parenting by both parents. In contrast, under what conditions and how best parents in
moderate conflict can continue to share decision making and parenting time exemplifies an area
about which we do not have a sufficient body of knowledge to recommend policy. Similar
concerns underlie the question of when having children alternate between two homes on a regular
basis becomes more anxiety producing than beneficial.
169
The classic example here is the famous study on mandatory arrest following a police call for
domestic violence. When the Minneapolis findings (carefully made through randomized trials) suggesting
that mandatory arrest would reduce recidivism by aggressors were replicated in other cities, a number
showed precisely the opposite result. Nonetheless, mandatory arrest remains the solution of choice. See
Lawrence Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of
Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680 (1992); and Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Effects of Arrest
on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 137 (1992).
The recent legislative success of proponents of more equal co-parenting may be thought of as just
such a “informational cascade,” (Ayres and Mitts, supra note 1, cite to Sushil Bikhchandani, David
Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational
Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 993 (1992); and Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch,
Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 151 (1998). enhanced of late by blogs, websites and the intense lobbying efforts of men’s
groups. Such groups will eventually propagate ideas about the availability of equal parenting through the
separating parenting world as well. In Arizona, the custody law reforms of 2012 were preceded by an
intensive media campaign.
170
See, e.g., Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 11, at 162: (“As a result, participants at the think tank
cautioned that the nuances apparent in the current literature on parenting time call for parental agreement or
individualized judicial assessments rather than decisions premised on legal presumptions..”)
171
See, e.g., Pruett & DiFonzio, supra note 11, at 168:
It is inappropriate to have a presumption that covers all situations when not enough is known to
verify that the presumption will benefit almost all children and families. Presumptions appear in
the law as a blunt instrument, yet we know very little empirically about how a presumption would
166
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Research has shown that re-partnering (through a second marriage or otherwise) does
affect child wellbeing. Again, there is no systematic look on how well it works, from the
child’s perspective, in cases of shared parenting.172 Most separating couples will repartner, though the new union is less likely to be remarriage for minorities.173
Following Ayres and Mitts’ explanation, once some number of parents have
voiced favorable opinions of joint parenting, others, in the face of uncertainty about it or
even prior mild opposition, will opt in,174 causing a series of pooling equilibria. These, in
turn, prevent discovery not only of which terms (here, parenting arrangements) are more
effective on average, but also “whether some are more effective under different
conditions such as locations and even time,” precisely the problem with default custody
rules.175 The authors suggest menu approaches, which may induce separating equilibria
whenever the cost of individualized negotiations for an alternative set of terms exceeds
the cost of contracting under the menu.176 After a discussion of applications to the recent
financial crisis, the authors conclude with “The Parable of the Bridges,”177 explaining
how in 1850, the Angers Bridge collapsed when a battalion of French soldiers marched
across it, spontaneously falling into step with the bridge’s vibrations, inadvertently
amplifying them. This, too, is a kind of pooling that may amplify systemic risk, and a
laissez-faire approach will not always work, according to Ayres and Mitts, who suggest
mandating or actively encouraging non-uniformity.178 Legislation that encourages the
formulation of individualized parenting plans without a single default custody pattern like
Arizona’s equal parenting default would maximize non-uniformity, better serving both
individual children and a future society in which more and more separating couples will
be unmarried.179

apply to same-sex couples, nonbiological parents, never-married partners who had no significant
partnership before having a child together, and so on.
172
Ayres & Mitts, supra note 1, suggest explicit randomized testing of law and regulation. Id. at 17,
suggesting that “separating equilibria complement randomization: the latter facilitates causal inference
while the former expands society’s knowledge regarding the covariance of potential outcomes with varying
type of contractual equilibria.” Id. at 24. While divorcing parents in Arizona are not presented with menus,
the forms many use for divorce, custody and support do present a menu look: do you want sole custody
(with or without supervision?) or joint custody (with or without a primary custodian), and, for parenting
plans, what do you want to do during the school year? The summer? For extended holidays? For nonweekend holidays?
173
Bramlett & Mosher, supra note 113. Pruett and DiFonzo express some concern about shared
parenting with this group. Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 11, at 166.
174
Ayres & Mitts, supra note 1, at 18.
175
Ayres & Mills supra note 1, at 20.
176
Ayres & Mitts, supra note 1, at 24. They use haggling over new car prices as an example of a task
that might be more happily accomplished through a limited menu of prices and financing terms. A menu
approach to be used by mediators is suggested in R. Emery, supra note 90, at 186, based upon the age of the
child and the amount of conflict in the parents’ relationship.
177
Ayres & Mitts, supra note 1, at 40.
178
Ayres & Mitts, supra note 1, at 41.
179
This brings us back to the summary of the Think Tank meeting on shared parenting complied by
Pruett and DiFonzo, supra note 11, who wrote (1) The most effective decisionmaking about parenting time
is inescapably case-specific, and (2) statutory presumptions prescribing specific allocations of shared
parenting time are unsupportable because no prescription will fit all, or even the majority of families’
particular circumstances. Id. at 153-54.

31

III.

An Empirical Test of Pooling Models: Randomized Cases from Maricopa

When I set about looking for particular jurisdictions in which to study the effect
of preferences for shared parenting and child support laws, I had several criteria: first, a
“modern” statute, that is, one that talked in terms not of custody and visitation but in
terms of parenting time. Second and relatedly, I wanted a state that for some time had
parenting guidelines propounded by the judiciary to give additional guidance to judges
making parenting time decisions. Third, I preferred to analyze states that had comparable
child support guidelines, especially in the way they treated substantially shared parenting.
Fourth, given the first criteria, I looked for states with substantial experience with shared
parenting: that is, states likely to be above average in shared parenting awards. And last,
I needed states that would allow me remote access to electronic records. This required
that the counties involved at least keep electronic records of not only judicial activity (or
minute entries), but also scanned documents such as pleadings, reports of various kinds,
motions, and decisions and orders of judges, mediators, and so forth. The two states I
ultimately chose were Arizona and Indiana. At the time of this writing, I have just
received permission to access the Indiana files, but have received and closely studied
records from the two most populous counties in Arizona, Maricopa (which includes
Phoenix)180 and Pima (which includes Tucson),181 which together include 81.6% of the
state’s residents.182
Melanie Fay, who is the Court Administrator in Maricopa County, selected a
sample of intake files from eight weeks scattered throughout 2008. These identified not
only file names and the type of action involved, but also the names of parties, their
addresses (where available), their counsel (or whether, as most couples were, they were
self-representing, or “pro per” as it is called there), and very often their dates of birth.
From these I randomly selected files representing specific types of actions,183 with the
following results:

601 Dissolution with Children
602 Dissolution without Children
621 Legal Separation

Frequency Percent
363
58.5
51
8.2
7
1.1

Valid
Cumulative
Percent
Percent
58.5
58.5
8.2
66.8
1.1
67.9

180

The 2013 population estimate according to the Census Department is 4009412.
The 2013 population is estimate is 996554.
182
The 2013 population estimate is 6,626,624
183
Please note that while I selected files randomly, I did not attempt to match the actual proportion of
files in the sample. Thus while my contrasts within and between groups does not present statistical issues, I
am sure that it is not representative of all the cases involving children decided in Maricopa, for instance.
The sample underrepresented the population of divorces with children among this group (62.6% compared
with 73% in the intake weeks represented), slightly underrepresented the unmarried custody cases (7.37%
compared to 9.7% in the intake weeks represented) and substantially overrepresented the establishment of
support group (27.7% compared to 17% in the weeks intake represented).
181

32

624 Custody
625 Protective Order
628 Support
Total

43
1
155
620

6.9
.2
25.0
100.0

6.9
.2
25.0
100.0

74.8
75.0
100.0

Many of the legal separations eventually were changed by one of the spouses to a final
dissolution. The one protective order case was not analyzed further, though there were
protective orders that were part of each of the other types of cases.184
There are two kinds of court data involved in the study. The first is publicly
available online,185 and is simply a listing of transactions with the clerk’s office dealing
with the file. The most important for analysis purposes is a second grouping within the
publically available file, a listing of the (minute) time scheduled with the decisionmaker.
The second kind of data was obtained after receiving institutional review board
approval and with assurances that individual records would be kept confidential. It was
the actual documents, such as pleadings and other motions, letters, reports, orders, and so
forth, involved with each file selected above. These documents contain a host of
information. Some are routine or appear in every case involving children. Such
documents include affidavits of service of process, orders to complete parenting time
education classes (and certifications when they were attended), motions and orders
dealing with continuances of various trial dates. Some were quite routine but did not
appear in every case, including motions and orders for return of evidence, cash receipts,
calculations of arrearages by the department of economic security (since the final
numbers would be found elsewhere), and orders of publication when respondents could
not be located. The information I coded came from complaints and answers (or motions
and responses), reports by child coordinators or of drug testing, completed parental
worksheets for child support, parenting plans (joint or sole), and final dissolution orders
(or orders dealing with motions or protective orders). The complaint typically included
names and birth dates of parents and children, if any, the date of marriage (if the parties
were married), addresses, occupations of the parents, what property was owned by the
couple and how the petitioner wanted it split, what parenting time was asked for, and
whether spousal support or child support was sought. It also indicated which party was
bringing the action (father or (at least nominally, in the case of Title IVD support)
mother) and whether or not there had been or currently was domestic violence. The
answer corroborated or sometimes corrected the details found in the complaint, asking for
the same or different things. The child support worksheets at the time of the dissolution
or other order identified which parent was the primary custodial parent, what each
parent’s monthly income was, whether or not either was responsible for additional or
184

Some of these cases were dismissed at various points, and for various reasons. A number (17)
couples reconciled and voluntarily dismissed the actions. A perhaps overlapping group of 28 had their
cases dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute them. A third group of 16 involved absent parents or
children and therefore a lack of jurisdiction to decide custody and/or support issues.
185
Maricopa’s are found at http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/FamilyCourtCases/.
Pima’s are found at http://www.agave.cosc.pima.gov/home.asp?Include=pages/record_search.htm.
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court ordered support for another child, whether the child was over 12 or had
extraordinary expenses, who was ordered to pay child support, what the parenting time of
the payor parent was (calculated by totaling the number of days or partial days), and
whether the amount was adjusted because it exceeded the amount needed for self-support
(in 2008, $775 monthly). Some cases involved temporary motions for support, requests
for custody evaluations or mediation, discovery motions (which I usually ignored unless
the total number of these was very large), actions involving protective orders and, if
requested, the results of protective order hearings, and motions post dissolution (or order)
to increase or decrease child support or parenting time or to enforce either. The motions
were accompanied by supporting reasons, which were frequently referred to by the court
in resolving them. The divorce decrees or parenting orders incorporated any agreements
of the parties, which sometimes were attached and sometimes separately filed. These
usually included parenting plans and sometimes included property settlement agreements.
The stand-alone support orders included reasons for deviating from the amounts
calculated on the worksheet (the state child support guideline amounts) and sometimes
employer information (which was also sometimes included in a separate document). All
of these alleged or found facts were carefully coded. [A sample worksheet, with
identifiers removed, from July of 2008 is appended.]
The child support guidelines explicitly defined and still define186 how to count
days or partial days for parenting time.187 Once the total is determined, a table in the
guidelines188 reveals what percentage of the obligation should be reduced to obtain
preliminary child support owed. For example, the traditional, or “basic,” parenting plan
would be for the child to spend every other weekend plus one evening during the week
plus split holidays plus two weeks in the summer with the non-primary parent. While
many parents use a calculator (obtainable as a free download) for this, the plan would
include 52 (for the weekends) + 3 (12 X .25 for weekend evenings) + 5 (for holidays)+
12 days (for summer) = 72 days, or a 10.5% reduction. A separate table known as
Appendix B equates the total support obligation borne (or imputed) to each parent when
parenting time is equal.189
186

Arizona Child Support Guidelines, Adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court, as Amended By
Executive Order 2011-46, effective June 1, 2011, drs10h.pdf, at 11.
187
Arizona Child Support Guidelines, Adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court, effective January 1,
2006, 2005CSG.pdf [2005 Guidelines] at page 10:
A. Each block of time begins and ends when the noncustodial parent receives or returns the child
from the custodial parent or from a third party with whom the custodial parent left the child. Third party
includes, for example, a school or childcare provider.
B. Count one day of parenting time for each 24 hours within any block of time.
C. To the extent there is a period of less than 24 hours remaining in the block of time, after all 24hour days are counted or for any block of time which is in total less than 24 hours in duration:
1. A period of 12 hours or more counts as one day.
2. A period of 6 to 11 hours counts as a half-day.
3. A period of 3 to 5 hours counts as a quarter-day.
5. Periods of less than 3 hours may count as a quarter-day if, during those hours, the
noncustodial parent pays for routine expenses of the child, such as meals.
188
Id. at 11.
189
2005 Arizona Guidelines, Appendix A. The simplest way of thinking about this is to subtract the
smaller amount due from each parent from the larger one and divide by 2.
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Even a preliminary examination of these 2008 court documents reveals at least
two worlds.190 The first is a world involving divorcing, relatively wealthy parents. For
these wealthier once-married parents, 27 percent indicate that they have equal custody,
and the average parenting time adjustment191 exceeds 122 days a year, or 33% of the total
time. The norm for these parents is clearly to share custody,192 and in those equaling or
exceeding the median income of mothers ($2300 a month),193 substantial parenting time
is quite routine. The marriages usually dissolve by consent decree, so that 50.6% had
agreed-upon orders that both dissolved the marriage and set custody.194 They did not
often have post-decree court modifications—56.4% had one or no appearances.195
For less wealthy, married Maricopa parents (those with less than the median
mother’s income), only 9.4% featured equal custody, and the average amount of
parenting time enjoyed by the parent without primary custody is just over 97 days, or
26% of the time (with a reduction in child support of 26.1%).196 The pattern of divorce
was different as well, reversing the practice of the wealthier parents. The predominating
dissolution (42.8%) was by default.197

The same startling results are obtained if mother’s income is divided by quintiles: lowest 98.63
days; fourth 100.855 days; 3rd 107.068 days; 2nd 121.143 days and highest 124.049 days.
191
More than 94% of the child support worksheets indicated such an adjustment.
192
Joint legal custody, or shared decisionmaking, was part of the plan for 73% of the couples.
193
There were several reasons to consider the income of mothers rather than fathers. First, in cases
with very low maternal income and high paternal income, it would be unusual not to have a primary
caretaker. Second, I knew that maternal, but not paternal, income was related to custody time. Third, using
the total child support amount would be misleading because there were frequently deductions for other
children supported by mothers and/or fathers. The gross income figures eliminated this concern.
194
28.8% had default dissolutions, and 13.5% had a decree of dissolution following a trial. Another
way of discriminating in the data is by looking at Hispanic surnames. The classic article suggesting that
this is the appropriate way to identify Hispanic or Latino families (used by the Census Bureau, is David L.
Word et al., “Demographic Aspects of Surnames from Census 2000,” (2008). Available at
http://www.census.gov/genealogy/www/surnames.pdf.) In the wealthier, married group 25.2% of the
couples had at least one with a common Hispanic surname (that is, with over 70% likelihood that the
person using it would self-identify as Hispanic according to the 2000 census). For the less wealthy,
married couples it was 36.7%, nearly the same as for the custody group (37.2%), but still lower than the
support group, where 49.7% had at least one common Hispanic surname. See Marc N. Elliott et al., Using
Indirect Estimates Based on Name and Census Tract to Improve the Efficiency of Sampling Matched
Ethnic Couples from Marriage License Data, 77 Pub. Opinion Q. 375 (2013). Ethnicity is important
because it is possible that with this population social norms might run toward mother-caretaking, and also
because information about the real possibility of judges’ ordering equal or substantially shared custody may
not be effectively communicated to the Hispanic parents. Hispanic parents may be less likely to elect
shared parenting. See Christine Linquist, Nord & Nicholas Zill, Non-Custodial Parents’ Participation in
their Children’s Lives: Evidence from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, vol. 1, at 12
(1996), available at fatherhood.hhs.gov/SIPP/NonCusp1.htm.
195
The corresponding number for the lower income married couples was 58.9%, though the single
most litigious, with 25 court entries following dissolution, was in this group.
196
Joint legal custody was part of the order or plan in 57.8% of these couples.
197
Default dissolutions occur when the other party is served but does not contest, or is reached only
by publication. In default dissolutions, the petitioner is granted whatever was established in the complaint
(or has been agreed to previously by the other). Consent dissolutions constituted only 26.7%, and
dissolutions by decree again were 15%.
190
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The difference becomes yet starker for unmarried parents. Again, there are two
groups. One involves actions to establish support, which are usually (though not always)
initiated by the state to collect arrearages or reimbursement for public assistance. In
these cases, the median (and mode, or most frequently recurring amount) mother’s
income was $1196 per month, not coincidentally that attributable to minimum wage (the
figure utilized to calculate TANF, or public assistance). Only 3, or 2% of these couples,
indicated equal parenting. Further, only 34% of these couples indicated any parenting
time adjustment to child support at all, and the average amount for this third was 77 days
only, or slightly more than 20% of the time (justifying a reduction of 10.5% in child
support).
The other unmarried group involved actions for custody, parenting time and
support. Fathers most often brought these suits, and many had established paternity
through the hospital’s paternity program and had been listed on the child’s birth
certificate. While they were not wealthy—the mother’s median income was $1500 a
month—more than 71% of the parents had an adjustment for parenting time on the
worksheets, and parenting time averaged 101 days (both figures higher than those for
than the lower income, married parents). These are, by definition, involved or at least
motivated fathers, and at least some indicated relationships of longstanding, one even of
twelve years. While they were not divorcing, so were not filing the associated forms,
they were active following initial custody decrees, with more than half having two or
more court appearances and one “outlier” boasting, if that is the right word, 33. As Pruett
and DiFonzo summarize the literature, they express concern about applying studies of
formerly married parents to in this group, who may be quite different.198
One other set of observations involves the role of lawyers. More than three
quarters (76.5%) of the petitioners completing divorces were not legally represented. For
the respondents, 96.1% were pro per, as this is called in Arizona. A valid question asked
by lay people is whether attorneys are “worth it.” While they are likely to have more
appearances pre-decree (averaging about two appearances in court as opposed to less than
one), the average number of reappearances at or post the decree is not significantly
different (3.39 for represented petitioners compared to 3.10 for the pro se).199 This is not
surprising, since the mean gross incomes for the represented groups are about $500
dollars higher for mothers and more than $2300 higher for fathers, so that more than
custody is typically at stake ($6053.27 total gross income per month for the represented
compared to $3700.49 for the pro se). Another indication that the cases might be more
complicated is that the represented group is more likely to have significant property other
than homes or pensions (usually stock or additional homes), with only about 12% of the
pro se parties having other significant assets compared to 26.9% of the parties
198

Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 11, at 155-56, 162, 166.
Typically in the pro se actions the post-decree petitions were to reduce child support (21% of the
self-represented cases), while in the petitioner represented cases, they were equally likely (15.2%) to be to
reduce child support or increase parenting time. Increasing parenting time, because of the adjustments to
child support, would also have the effect of reducing the support. The threshold for granting a change to
ordered child support is a deviation of 15% or more in the amount calculated on the worksheet. In the
cases where only a reduction was sought, it was typically because the obligor’s income had decreased
(and/or the obligor was unemployed).
199
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represented by attorneys. In the support establishment cases, while the state represented
the custodial parent (always the mother unless a collateral relative had custody), it was
extremely uncommon to have the father represented. Likewise for the custody cases, few
had representation.200
We return now to the values argued for various child custody (or parenting time)
regimes. How well does a state with a large amount of shared and even a significant
amount of equal custody promote continuity and stability, maximize time with both
parents, and minimize conflict and violence? Are these values systematically satisfied
differently for different groups?
continuity and stability. Two methods of measuring continuity and stability seem
possible from this data. The first is the most obvious, appears in other literature,201 and
would look at how stable custody awards remain over time. In particular, one might
compare the number of motions to change parenting time (or change the parenting plan
completely, say, from a sole custody plan to a joint one or from one primary residence to
the other) based upon the original order (comparing primary maternal or paternal custody
to equally shared custody). One might even make the comparison depend upon the
number of days of parenting time. Tendencies to change custody might also depend upon
income, representation (or not), age or gender of the child, and whether substance abuse
or mental illness was involved with the case.202
The more difficult question considers whether the original order itself was
consistent with the parenting done before separation.203 The files do not contain any
direct and consistent measure of parental practices before separation. One possible
indication would be that one of the spouses was staying at home to do child care.
Divorcing parents do list their occupations in their complaints and responses, and some
did put down “child care” or “stay at home parent” or “none” (as opposed to
“unemployed”). However, the fact that one parent isn’t working while the other does
isn’t always indicative of the childcare arrangement.204 Further, the complaints do not
always contain this occupation information (and never do for support cases, at least for
the non-paying parent). A more reliable indication may be gross wage differences
between the parents, since marriages are typically assortative (so that the spouse will
have comparable education and other human capital)205, while staying out of the labor

200

8/43 were represented.
Maccoby & Mnookin, supra note 78, Melli and Brown, supra note 49, Reynolds, supra note 129
all refer to “maternal custody drift”.
202
Post-decree discovery or incidence of child abuse by a parent or partner might also result in
parenting time modifications, but there were a very small number of these cases.
203
This is, of course, the default of the ALI Principles, supra note 9, § 2.07 for parents who cannot
agree on a parenting plan. The intuition is that absent the preferred agreed-upon plan, the second best
solution is to approximate whatever the parents were doing before.
204
In fact, some older literature indicates that unemployed Hispanic fathers, in particular, are less
likely to do child care or housework for psychological/cultural reasons; that to assume women’s work
would threaten masculine identity.
205
GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (2d ed., 1991). Recently, see Elizabeth
McClintock, Beauty and Status: The Illusion of Exchange in Partner Selection, 79 AM. SOC. REV. – (2014).
201
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force to care for dependents or working part time has a permanent negative effect on
income.206
However well this may work for married couples or for long term cohabitants
(those who file custody actions),207 it is unlikely to describe many unmarried couples,
both of whom may be unemployed or employed at minimum wage regardless of child
care obligations. One would assume that for these couples, a move toward equal custody
of a young child would present a great and perhaps threatening break in continuity. (On
the other hand, if a third party, such as an aunt or grandmother, is providing the child care
while the parents work there may be little or at least a smaller dampening effect on
wages.) The strongest case for a lack of continuity may be for couples who did not live
together after the birth of the child, who has been living with one parent only from birth.
Once the initial order has been made and some time has passed, a new continuity
arises (or the original one, whatever he parents were doing prior to separation continues,
is strengthened). The child or children becomes used to the new pattern of spending time
with the parents, as well as accustomed to the neighborhood (or neighborhoods), school,
after school friends, and so forth. Some parents want to relocate to some distance away,
claiming employment opportunities for themselves or a new spouse, the need to be closer
to families of origin, and so forth. These cases are frequently litigated, especially if the
parents have been sharing parenting time (and have joint legal custody) A primary parent
may well claim that necessary relocation permits the primary relationship to remain
stable and continuous. The parent who would be left behind claims (even if there can be
no claim based on equal custody or parenting time), that the neighborhood and friends
and school will all be lost. One famous case also pointed out that relocation would
threaten the fragile relationship between father and child.208 If the noncustodial parent
has been faithfully spending the ordered time, courts may be reluctant to permit the
move.209 As with several features of equally shared custody, geographic restrictions may
be particularly hard on the less wealthy participants in the labor force, who usually move
to take advantage of employment. The impact will be most keenly felt by immigrants,
particularly seasonal employees or those without documents.
The second major value going into Arizona’s best interest of the child
consideration is to maximize time with both parents. This was clearly a function of
statutory revisions in 2010 and 2013, but shared custody seems to have been a feature of

206

See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Opting Out Among Women with Elite Education, Vanderbilt University
Law School Law and Economics Working Paper 13-05 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2221482; Heather Boushay, Opting Out: The Effect of
Children on Women’s Employment in the United States, 14 FEMINIST ECON. 1 (2008).
207
Some of the custody (624) complaints stated that fathers had done the primary caretaking while
the couple lived together, in one case, for twelve years. Some of these couples had informal equal
parenting plans that were only now being threatened.
208
Marriage of Lamusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2006).
209
See, e.g., H.A. v. A.A., No. 03A01-1308-DR-354 (Feb. 5, 2014 Ind. Ct. App.)(mother’s wish to
move to Hawaii with new husband, though in good faith, was not in best interests of child).
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Arizona cases even by 2008.210 Generally, it may be worth discussing whether such a
value should be imposed when not constitutionally required (as in Loving v. Virginia211 or
Brown v. Board of Education212), where groups were grouped based upon race.
Maximizing time with both separating parents equally does not seem to present courts
with a similar constitutional question, and the child’s interests may outweigh the parents’.
In Iowa, where the legislature (over the objection of the judiciary and family law Bar),
enacted presumptive shared parenting time, the Supreme Court in Hansen v. Hansen
(2007)213 declared that the child’s best interests still must be considered in every case, so
that basing a decision on a single factor only is not appropriate.
Shared parenting time has been felt to be appropriate for children in many states
for some thirty years so long as it’s requested by both fit parents.214 One critique of
mediation brought by feminists was that mediators were punishing parents who did not to
conform to their preferred method (shared parenting) by awarding, or threatening to
award, primary custody to the other parent.215 With the 2008 sample, we can examine
how frequently shared parenting would have been selected anyway by considering
whether it is more or less frequent when mediation is used to settle the case.216 Another
210

The median amount of parenting time enjoyed by the divorcing parent with the smaller share is 99
days in Pima County and 106 days in Maricopa. The fact that the mean is so much higher in Maricopa
(111 days) is driven by the large number of equal custody cases in that jurisdiction. (It is also 99 days in
Pima County, for the equal custody cases are balanced by a number of cases in which one parent did not
receive any time at all for various reasons).
211
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
212
347 U.S. 483 1954).
213
733 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 2007).
214
See, for example, 19A ME. CODE §1653(2); TEX. CIV. CODE § 153.001; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13
(c) (2010). Some statutes explicitly require that it be logistically possible given the parents’ incomes,
ability to cooperate, and locations.
215
Grillo, supra note 36.
216
Compared to an overall median of 109 days for the spouse who was not the primary custodial
parent, the mediated cases had a median of 143 days, which is a statistically significant difference. The
means were also statistically significantly different at p < .01 (107 versus 130 days). If the mediated result
turns out to work less well than the non-mediated, there may be a problem with the automatic referrals
whenever parties do not agree. And it does. The 62 mediated divorce cases were significantly (at p <.001)
more likely to have more post-decree appearances (2.4 for non-mediated compared to 5.84 mediated), postdecree motions for more (.09/.306) or less (.063/.226) custody, decreases (.157/.323) or increases
(.067/.242) in child support, and enforcement of child support (.11/.258) or visitation (.033/.097) than the
300 not referred to mediation. These rather large differences of at least 200% suggest as well that the
temporary gains for the court system may be offset by the later problems in the contested custody cases that
are automatically referred. Of course they are not causative—mediation does not necessarily create the
problems (though the larger number of days of parenting time may). While the number of days of
parenting time increased with mediation, the tendency for equal custody did not (Pearson’s R = .311;
Spearman correlation = .475). In contrast, the contested divorces (DDIs) for Maricopa did not have many
significant consequences in post-decree litigation. While the number of appearances was higher (.20
compared to .121 for default or consent decrees), this was apparently only due to the slightly higher
incidences of motions to reduce (.292 compared to .169 and enforce (.229 compared to .12) child support,
not custody or visitation changes.
Days of parenting time with or without mediator involvement: Maricopa completed
divorces with children
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possibility is to see whether the frequency is affected when either parent brought up
domestic violence (at least alleging that it had occurred during the marriage) either as part
of the original pleading or at any rate before divorce. Surprisingly, the mean number of
parenting days was almost exactly the same.217 Finally, there were some cases where
both spouses asked for sole custody in their original complaint and answer.218
Relatedly, there is the important goal of minimizing the child’s exposure to
conflict.219 From the Maricopa court files dataset we cannot directly measure the impact
of conflict upon children any more than we can look at the positive effects of shared
parenting.220 Nor can we directly measure conflict’s impact on the parents.221 There are
some indirect measures of conflict. One is a consideration of post-decree domestic
violence petitions. These are less likely to be strategic since domestic violence militates
against shared parenting only at the time of the original order, and will not by itself
justify a change in the parenting time schedule (though there may be a change to a neutral
or supervised place for the exchange). In a simple binomial regression, (meaning that the
dependent variable, whether there was one or more post-decree petitions for protective

Mediator involved

Mean

N

Std. Deviation

.0

106.653

229

55.4786

1.0

129.830

53

48.6786

Total

111.009

282

54.9375
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This either suggests that parties are not filing for protective orders strategically or that courts are
for the most part ignoring allegation of domestic violence. The mean number of parenting days in
completed divorces involving protective orders or allegations of violence in complaint or answer was 110
days. For those without, the mean number was 111.18.
218
There were not many of these (9). In one, the court awarded split custody. In another, the father
was eventually going to be completely disabled by his Lou Gehrig’s disease. In a third, the court awarded
equal joint custody and the parties divorced by consent decree (prepared by father). No child support was
ordered because of the equal custody. The mother ended up with the marital home, paying $45K to father
to equalize. The parties were so low income that any award of child support would have exceeded their
ability to pay; both had been living in the marital home and neither wanted to move.
219
See, e.g., Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 11, at 164:
The think tank experts agreed that, when either or both parents have been violent through physical,
verbal, or psychological abuse of the other parent, a comprehensive assessment is necessary before
a shared parenting plan is considered. A substantive body of research makes clear how destructive
such violence can be to parents’ ability to raise their children with the requisite sensitivity and
structure that promotes victim and child safety and well-being. In addition to diminishing
parenting capacity, family violence negatively affects children’s well-being directly. When
children are directly involved in the conflict or are the subjects of it, the probabilities for their
healthy development are far worse.
220
As previously mentioned, conflict and especially children’s exposure to it is agreed by academics
to have negative consequences for children. See, e.g., Elrod & Dale, supra note 27; Elster, supra note 77,
and sources cited in notes 90 and 93, supra. There were occasions where judges or child welfare
professionals wrote that the child was having problems largely because of the parents’ continued litigation
or bitterness, but nothing systematic.
221
There was anecdotal information in the files about parents’ cashing out retirement funds to meet
legal obligations or seeking professional help to deal with the continued stress of the divorce.
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orders, can be answered yes or no) predicting .06 of the variance, shows that the more
equal the parenting time (by the number of days of adjustment in child support), the more
likely there was to be a protective order request, holding constant median household
income in the census tract222 and whether or not the parties were represented. The
exponents signify that each additional day of parenting time beyond 109 (the mean) was
associated with an additional 1% likelihood of a post-decree protective order. This is a
troubling finding.223 Note that it is the unrepresented (pro per) couples who are
considerably likely to file for these orders, perhaps because they cannot afford
representation in seeking a modification of parenting time.224
Variable
Days of parenting to
time
Median household
income
Pro per (no attorney)
Constant

B
.011

S.E.
.005

Sig.
.016

Exp(B)
1.011

.000

.000

.022

1.000

.802
-5.566

.474
.970

.090
.000

2.229
.004

Another indirect way of detecting conflicted couples is to see whether motions for
temporary custody or changes in custody and/or child support were contested. This can
be done by noting the number of court documents entitled RES (for response) and seeing
if the number of parenting time days is different for the two groups (or vice-versa).
While the difference here is not statistically significant,225 motion-contested cases before
the decree are associated with more orders (of almost all types) after the decree.226 While
contesting various actions227 does not mean that the parties are physically violent, it does
show a willingness to spend money and time, including the court’s, in an attempt to
thwart what the other is doing or seeking. While motions for reductions in parenting time
222

Neither the gross income of the mother nor the father was statistically significant.
It might indicate that the screens for violence at initial hearings were not accurate and/or that
additional opportunities given by the frequent exchanges of the child created more opportunities for
conflict. In one case in which the former apparently occurred, the trial court awarded equal custody
because the father in question hadn’t abused the parties’ child, but only the mother’s older child.
224
Most jurisdictions have consciously made filing for protective orders relatively simple and
low cost.
225
Fewer days were awarded in the conflicted cases (111 to 104, but this isn’t statistically
significant). Only 5/44 contested cases (11.4%) had equal custody at the time of decree, compared to
56/295 (19%) of the less contested. This is actually an encouraging sign that the courts aren’t awarding
equal custody often in the cases where it is least likely to be successful.
226
There were statistically significantly more post decree motions (.132 of the cases compared to .136 of
them), motions for decreases (.157 to .386) and increases (.075 to .250) in child support, motions to reduce
parenting time (.072 to .227) to enforce child support (.110 to .318) or visitation (.035 to .114) , and postdecree protective orders (.069 to .205).
227
I do not include an answer to the original divorce decree. Some of these corrected things like
children’s birthdays or the dates of the marriage, asked for a reversion to a pre-marriage surname, or
specified particular assets that had been left out of the complaint. An answer also makes a default decree
possible if the parties have worked out a parenting plan and property settlement, as many couples had, or
dissolution by consent if that was sought. It also gives jurisdiction for support and custody actions when
one spouse was out of state.
223
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were significantly correlated with the number of days ordered, the significance disappears
once the mother’s gross income is included.228
A rather obvious check is on the number of court actions post decree. This is not
significantly correlated with parenting time,229 nor is the assignment of a parenting
coordinator, which happens in the most contested cases.230 The cases in which one parent
at least allegedly had drug, alcohol or mental illness problems were some of the most
litigated in the sample. One reason for this is that in the substance abuse cases, frequent
negative drug testing (TASC, using hair) was often a requirement to avoid or be freed
from supervised visitation.231 Another is that drug violations are typically criminal, and
all serious deficiencies on the part of the parent may be enough not only to reduce or
suspend custody but also to involve the child protective system.232 Finally, in the
substance abuse cases anyway, not being entirely truthful is part of the
symptomatology.233
Contested Custody Cases
The small proportion of divorcing couples who end up in court could be
quarreling about many things. While custody may be a factor, so may be ownership of a
house or business or pension plan (or even, in some cases, the family dogs). However, of
the 49 Maricopa cases where the divorce was granted after a hearing, 47 involved
custody issues that could not be resolved by the parents even at the 11th hour.234 In 33 of
228
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It is, however, correlated significantly with higher total amounts of support ordered.
There is no statistical correlation between having equal custody and the assignment of a
coordinator, either. What is correlated significantly are the traditional “fault” grounds for divorce:
adultery, substance abuse, and pre-decree protective order claims of domestic violence.
231
In Maricopa, 18 cases required TASC testing. In Pima County, only 5 cases required TASC
testing.
232
Twelve of the Maricopa County cases involved CPS investigations; of these a third involved drug
or alcohol abuse.
233
Dorothy Roberts, in SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2001) has made the
point that the child welfare system tends to be more involved with families of color than otherwise, and that
the presence of social workers in the community itself may exacerbate social problems. See also Dorothy
H. Roberts, Child Welfare’s Paradox, 49 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 881-901 (2007).
234
More than a quarter (26.9%, or 94 of 404) of the Pima County divorce cases were contested, and
nearly half of these (43) involved competing claims for custody from the start. Contested actions were
statistically significantly likely to be referred to a mediator (.380, p < .001) and were even more closely
associated with requiring a child custody evaluator or an interview with the child (.402, p < .001). After
dissolution, they continued to display conflict, with significantly more motions to increase custody (.258, p
< .001) or decrease it (.292, p < .001) or child support (.169, p < .001), or, notably, post-decree complaints
230
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these cases, the responding parent had filed an answer (spending $269 to do so). And in
32 of those 33, the responding parent asked for a different custody arrangement than had
the parent who filed for dissolution. At the extreme, each parent asked for sole custody
in him- or herself, with no visitation (or restricted visitation) to be granted to the other
parent. Sometimes one wanted sole custody while the other sought joint legal custody
and reasonable visitation. Sometimes they disagreed from the start of the divorce
action235 over which of them should be the primary custodian. In most cases, court
procedures or the judge personally forced the parents into mediation or conciliation to try
to get them to settle the custody action. They also attended mandatory parenting classes
and sometimes classes for high conflict couples. But they could not agree to work as a
team even though they had been told that conflict was hard on their children. Because
they staked out their positions early, it does not seem that the process or their attorneys
encouraged their views (and most parents, in fact, were not represented).
Eventually, one or the other parent usually won, meaning that what they’d asked
for in the complaint was granted by the trial court. Sometimes the decisionmaking court
needed the help of custody evaluators, who might even interview the child to ascertain
the child’s feelings. Frequently the court took the custody decision “under advisement,”
meaning that the parents did not know the outcome until some time (hours or days) later.
In the vast majority of cases, after fighting these fierce battles, the parents were supposed
to get over their hostility and co-parent.236 In many they would need to exchange the
children frequently (sometimes at the police station). In four, the court granted them
equal custody even though neither had asked for it. In several cases, the children ended
up being abused by a parent during custodial time or by his or her partner. In more than a
few, domestic violence continued after the divorce.
While some of these cases disappeared from the legal landscape after the terms
were declared, many continued to litigate, some until April of 2014. They continued
conflict over child support, enforcement of the parenting schedules (including tardiness
or refusal to open the door), and a number had post-decree domestic violence incidents.
Sometimes the litigation involved payment for counseling of the children. In one case
the court moaned that the children would do better in school if they weren’t subjected to
the continual stress of parental bickering. A child coordinator wrote in one report that the
“parties are observed in communication dynamic of distrust, hostility and accusation.”
One of the assumptions of those arguing for shared parenting is that the cases
involving domestic violence can be screened out early in the process. In Arizona, while
of domestic violence (.323, p < .001). There was no significant correlation with the incomes of either
mother or father, nor with the number of parenting time days (96.6 days for contested cases, 100 for
uncontested), and only slightly with either parent’s being represented (-.105, p < .10). About 20% of the
contesting parents had equal custody in the dissolution decrees compared to 24% of the less contentious
cases. These were more likely to have had court ordered equal custody (.294 did, compared to .139 in the
remainder of the cases, p < .10), and far more likely to have motions for less custody on the other parent’s
part (.353 compared to .087, p < .001).
235
On occasion, the parties were still living together at the time of filing.
236
Of the 39 contested custody Pima cases, only 25% had less than 60 days of parenting time, and
50% had more than 180 days.
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the judges were successful in doing this a number of times, in some they were not. More
than half the contested cases (25/47) involved at least alleged domestic violence (and
some had two or more protective orders upheld after hearings). In one, where a mother
gave up her claim for sole parenting on the day of trial, the judge asked the father to leave
the courtroom, went through the questions again, and decreed that she had voluntarily
decided to share custody. Substantial domestic violence operates as a factor in Arizona
only against shared decisionmaking (legal custody), not shared parenting time.237
Clearly, public policy in Arizona and many other states disfavors false
accusations of domestic violence or abuse.238 It is important, therefore, not to give
incentives to claim abuse in order to get custody (or property or revenge). But
indications of drug or alcohol abuse or mental illness and particularly pre-decree
domestic violence together predict many of the cases of post-decree domestic violence.239
These cases seem to call for early intervention, better screening, and some solution other
than substantially equal parenting.
Some Early Conclusions
Contrary to some of the academic literature, the Maricopa cases reveal little
evidence of either complaints of domestic violence in order to escape shared parenting or
of allegations that a primary custodial parent was alienating the child.240 But the
incidence of domestic violence correlating with increased parenting time certainly
If the parent who committed an act of domestic violence is seeking parenting time, that
parent has to prove to the judge that parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly harm
the child's emotional development. The judge may place conditions on parenting time that best
protects the child and the other parent from further harm. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-403.03(F). In the
cases I examined, children were sometimes exchanged at police stations, for example.
238
See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. § 25-403 (11) (making false reporting a factor against the award of legal
decisionmaking or parenting time); and Ariz. Stat. § 13-2907.02 (making false reporting of child abuse a
misdemeanor). Other states have similar rules. See, e.g., in New York, Karen PP v. Clyde QQ, 197
A.D.2d 753 (3rd Dept. 1993) (award of custody to the parent falsely accused); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.50(4); Cal. Fam. Code § 3022.5 (a motion for reconsideration of existing child custody order will be
granted if based on the fact that the other parent was convicted of falsely accusing the moving parent of
child abuse); 325 ILL. CONS. STAT. § 5/4 (knowingly filing a false report is a misdemeanor).
239
In simple correlations, domestic violence and resolution by a court rather than default or consent is
significant at p < .01 (coefficient is .351) and substance abuse or mental illness significant at p < .01
(coefficient is .227). A logistic regression with just these two predictors produces a Cox and Snell R 2 of
.102, with each significant at p <.05, domestic violence at p < .001. A case is more than six times more
likely (exponent is 6.61) to end up with a DDI decree if domestic violence is alleged early on and more
than twice as likely (exponent is 2.32) if there’s substance abuse or mental illness. In Pima, the logistic
regression predicted .066, while pre-decree domestic violence made it 7.455 times more likely that postdecree violence would be an issue (while substance/abuse/mental illness was not statistically significant).
240
The Maricopa cases contained four cases in which the noncustodial parent claimed some form of
alienation: three of these claims were made by fathers. Pima had only one. In each county, there were a
few POP orders that were not substantiated after hearings (with complaints made equally often by both men
and women), and some cases in which the court found that domestic violence had occurred, but that it was
not serious, or, in one case, was only directed to the other parent and not the child, or in another, was only
directed against the father’s stepdaughter. The horribles foretold by both political sides do not seem to
have materialized. There was precisely one case involving enforcement of a parenting time decree in
Maricopa, and 11 in Pima.
237
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warrants further examination, and gives one pause. It would be far less concerning if we
could identify these cases in advance, but courts are not apparently consistently doing
so.241
The fact that shared parenting has become the norm neither for most of the
separated unmarried parents (at least not from the legal records left behind) nor for the
less wealthy parents in our sample is also troubling. If shared parenting truly benefits
children, that benefit should not be reserved for the wealthy, made difficult for the middle
class (either logistically or because of the decreased child support owed), and certainly
should not be impossible for the poor. Nor should a differential impact upon Hispanics in
the sample be ignored.242 This difference (in parenting days) persists even when income
is included in simple regression analysis, and is nearly as strong as the income effect.243
I began this inquiry wondering whether it was true that fathers asked for more
custody than they actually wanted in order to reduce or eliminate child support payments.
I did not find evidence of systematic opportunism (as I might have if there had been
many motions to change custody back to a primary system after a lapse of time), but
there were a handful of cases of this. I would like to track what particular judges are
doing in the two counties to see if, despite the statute, there is variability in the tendency
to award shared parenting. I also plan to use the current sample to question whether
parents who will not pay child support when able can be identified in advance. I am also
beginning to look at cases from Indiana, which had a different scheme for reducing child
support based on parenting time. There might be still less evidence of “trading” going on
than the small amount found in Maricopa244 or potentially less of a disparity among
wealthier and poorer parents. Obviously it would be good to have either interviews with
children or run a series of psycho-social tests on them, both to find out if they do truly
241

Margaret F. Brinig, Leslie Drozl & Loretta Frederick, Perspectives on Joint Custody Parenting as
Applied to Domestic Violence Cases, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 272 (2014).
242
In the Maricopa divorce sample, 14% had equal custody compared to nearly 20% for the nonHispanic sample. Even for the non-equal parenting plans, the Hispanic numbers were far (and statistically
significantly) lower: 95.53 days compared to 115.28 for non-Hispanics.
243
The R2 predicts .044 of the variance.
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I found 10 cases in which it may have occurred in Maricopa (numbers 72, 93, 143, 161, 188, 327,
360, 480, 484 and 595).
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benefit from additional days of parenting time. While a successful legislative attempt to
create still more shared parenting has been made by legislators in Arizona, it would be
interesting to see whether a strong shared parenting presumption had more or less traction
in a state without a track record of shared parenting.245
The law in place at the time of my study was typical of many states “friendly” to joint
parenting.246 The state moved in 2010247 and again in 2012248 progressively toward equal
parenting for all separating couples.249 The child support rules, again typical ones,
automatically deduct from the amount a parent must otherwise pay for a scheduled
parenting time adjustment.250 If the parents are equal custodians, the total amounts
attributable to shared expenses at their joint income levels is equalized between the two
households.251 This means that for a high earning father and lower earning mother, the
245

ARK. CODE § 9-13-101, enacted in 2013, has very strong language mandating maximizing the time
spent with each parent if requested by either or ordered by the judge. However, Arkansas is a state that
until recently had a presumption against shared parenting, and it is unclear whether the statute will have
much, if any, effect. Attorneys (19) answering a survey there were all aware of the new law, but nearly
60% thought that it would make a very small or small effect in practice, and all but one thought that there
was less than a 40% chance that a father would be awarded equal custody before passage of the new law
when the mother asked for sole custody. Afterwards, 8 thought there would be at least a 50% chance.
246
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25–403.01. Sole and joint custody
A. In awarding child custody, the court may order sole custody or joint custody. This section does not
create a presumption in favor of one custody arrangement over another. The court in determining custody
shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex.
B. The court may issue an order for joint custody over the objection of one of the parents if the court
makes specific written findings of why the order is in the child's best interests. In determining whether joint
custody is in the child's best interests, the court shall consider the factors prescribed in section 25–403,
subsection A and all of the following:
1. The agreement or lack of an agreement by the parents regarding joint custody.
2. Whether a parent's lack of agreement is unreasonable or is influenced by an issue not related to the best
interests of the child.
3. The past, present and future abilities of the parents to cooperate in decision-making about the child to
the extent required by the order of joint custody.
4. Whether the joint custody arrangement is logistically possible.
C. The court may issue an order for joint custody of a child if both parents agree and submit a written
parenting plan and the court finds such an order is in the best interests of the child. The court may order
joint legal custody without ordering joint physical custody.
CHILD CUSTODY, 2005 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 45 (S.B. 1045) (WEST).
247
Laws 2010, Ch. 186, § 2.
248
Laws 2012, Ch. 309, § 8, eff. Jan. 1, 2013
249
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403.02 now includes in part:
B. Consistent with the child's best interests in § 25-403 and §§ 25-403.03, 25-403.04 and 25403.05, the court shall adopt a parenting plan that provides for both parents to share legal decision-making
regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting time. The court shall not prefer a
parent's proposed plan because of the parent's or child's gender.
250
The current Guidelines, adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court and effective Jan. 1, 2011, are
available at https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/31/GuideSched10072011.pdf. The appropriate tables remain
at Appendices A and B.
251
The example provided in the Guidelines, supra note 223, at 13-14 is
EXAMPLE: After making all applicable adjustments under Sections 9 and 13, the
remaining child support obligation is $1500. The parents' proportionate shares of the
obligation are $1000 and $500. To equalize the child support available in both
households, deduct the lower amount from the higher amount ($1000 - $500 = $500),
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amount paid will be only a fraction of what he would ordinarily pay, and when the
incomes are roughly equal, the ordered payment will often be zero. The difference is not
made up by alimony (spousal support), which is typically less in amount than the
difference in child support, and which usually ends after two or three years.252 In some
cases, the mothers sharing parenting time ended up on public assistance though the
fathers were living quite comfortably.253

then divide the balance in half ($500 ÷ 2 = $250). The resulting amount, $250, is paid to
the parent with the lower obligation.
252
While this may have been a national trend for some years, New Jersey seems to be moving in the
direction of eliminating permanent alimony. The bill passed July 26, 2014, and has been sent to the
governor for his signature. See http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202661000396/NJ-AssemblyCommittee-Approves-Major-Overhaul-of-Alimony-System#ixzz35mnhrrua. The Bill numbers are A845,
A971 and A1649, as amended.
253

Some examples are Pima 25, 277, 319 and 350, and Maricopa 210, in all of which more than 30%
was deducted from the amount fathers were otherwise to pay, and the mothers went on public assistance.
The fathers’ incomes varied from $2340 a month to $3797, and they paid from a low of $146.39 to a high
of $382 in child support.
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